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"The Most Glorious Story
of Failure in the Business":
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation
and the Origins of ERISA
JAMES A. WOOTENt
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation occupies a special
place in the lore of the Emlloyee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). No single event is more
closely associated with ERISA than the shutdown of the
Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana.2  When
Studebaker-Packard closed the facility in December 1963
t Associate Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. I have
benefited from conversations or interviews with a number of participants in the
events recounted here. Thanks to Frank Cummings, Lester Fox, Vance Hartke,
Ken Morris, Robert Paul, the late Leonard Woodcock, and Howard Young for
sharing their recollections with me. Jim Atleson, Richard Bernstein, Guyora
Binder, Jonathan Cedarbaum, Frank Cummings, Markus Dubber, Sharon
Entress, Bill Nelson, John Langbein, Bill LaPiana, David Moss, Steven Sass,
Schlegel, Robert Steinfeld, and Howard Young provided comments,
encouragement, and advice. I also benefited from discussions with participants
in the Legal History Colloquium at New York University School of Law. I owe a
large debt to the staffs of the Studebaker National Museum and the Walter P.
Reuther Library at Wayne State University. Their assistance and cooperation
were indispensable. My archival research was supported by a grant from the
Olin Summer Fellowship Program at Yale Law School. The first draft of this
paper was written while I was a Golieb Fellow at New York University School
of Law. A grant from TIAA-CREF gave me time for editing and rewriting. I
greatly appreciate their assistance. Any mistakes are mine. The quote in the
title is from Projection of Pension Fund Activities 3 (Feb. 22, 1971) (Papers of
Harrison Williams, Box 127, no folder, Special Collections and Archives,
Rutgers University Libraries). Copyright © 2001 James A. Wooten.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the
Private Pension Plan Reform Movement, in JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 68 (3d ed. 2000); DENNIS E. LOGUE & JACK S.
RADER, MANAGING PENSION PLANS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO IMPROVING PLAN
PERFORMANCE 71 (1998); JAMES H. SMLLEAOUT, THE UNCERTAIN RETIREMENT:
SECURING PENSION PROMISES IN A WORLD OF RISK 8-9 (1996); Thomas Marsh, 20th
Anniversary of ERISA: The Journey May Just Be Beginning, MONEY MGMT.
LETTER, Apr. 25, 1994, at 1 (special supp.).
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the pension plan for hourly workers did not have enough
assets to meet its obligations. Retirees and retirement-
eligible employees aged sixty and older received their full
pension, but the plan defaulted on its obligations to younger
employees. Some received a lump-sum payment worth a
fraction of the pension they expected, and others got
nothing at all.
We remember the Studebaker shutdown because it was
a "focusing event" for the nascent campaign for pension
reform. As the political scientist John Kingdon observes,
social problems often "need a little push to get the attention
of people in and around government. That push is
sometimes provided by a focusing event like a crisis or
disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem."3
Public officials and private-sector experts were already
considering proposals for additional regulation of pension
plans when Studebaker-Packard announced that it would
leave South Bend. The shutdown helped push debate about
pension reform into the legislative arena. The plight of
Studebaker employees provided a vivid symbol of the
hazards regulation aimed to redress, and reformers invoked
Studebaker again and again in the decade before Congress
passed ERISA.
Yet it requires a closer look to see how and why the
Studebaker shutdown assumed its place in the political
history of ERISA. Not every calamitous event becomes a
catalyst for legislative reform. A calamity is more likely to
draw attention to a social problem when people interested
in the problem are prepared to take advantage of the
opportunity the calamity presents.4 This is what happened
in the Studebaker case. By the time the shutdown occurred,
the United Auto Workers union (UAW) was well aware that
"default risk"-the risk that a pension plan will terminate
without enough funds to meet its obligations-threatened
union members. In the early 1960s, UAW pension
specialists devised a remedy-a proposal for "pension
reinsurance" that is a precursor of the termination-
insurance program created by Title IV of ERISA. The
Studebaker shutdown gave the UAW an opportunity to
move default risk and termination insurance onto the
3. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 94-95
(2d ed. 1995).
4. See id. at 98, 142-143.
684 [Vol. 49
ORIGINS OF ERISA
legislative agenda. The success of this effort in agenda-
setting indelibly linked the shutdown to the cause of
pension reform.
Parts I and II of this article recount the origins and
development of collectively bargained retirement plans in
the years after World War II. As I explain, the UAW and
other industrial unions used pension plans to manage
organizational problems that might have emerged from the
seniority systems these unions negotiated to ration access
to jobs. A pension plan lessened the potential for conflict
between older and younger workers because it provided
income security to older workers and, in doing so, induced
retirements that enhanced job security for younger union
members. A retirement plan, however, was an expensive
undertaking. To hold down the short-term cost of
retirement plans, the UAW agreed to provisions that placed
younger employees at risk of not receiving a pension.
One source of risk was underfunding. As was the case
at Studebaker, UAW retirement plans almost never had
enough assets to pay all of their pension obligations. Part
III examines why this was so. Although the newness of
UAW retirement plans and the tax laws partly account for
underfunding, the union's policy of negotiating retroactive
increases in retirement benefits and spreading the cost over
many years also reduced funding levels. The existence of
underfunding meant that employees ran the risk that their
retirement plan would terminate and default on its
obligations. This risk materialized in 1958, when
Studebaker-Packard terminated the pension plan for hourly
employees of the Packard Motor Car Company. Packard
workers got even less than their counterparts at
Studebaker would receive in 1964. Part IV describes the
termination of the Packard pension plan.
The Packard termination convinced UAW president
Walter Reuther that the union had to protect members
from default risk. One option was for union negotiators to
bargain for higher levels of funding. The union rejected this
approach because it would require slower growth of pension
benefits-which would lead older employees to be less
willing to retire-or larger employer contributions-which
would result in lower wages for active employees. Instead of
addressing default risk through collective bargaining, union
pension experts developed a proposal for a government-run
insurance program that would guarantee the obligations of
6852001]
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defined-benefit pension plans. As I explain in Part V, the
appeal of termination insurance was that it reconfigured
the institutional framework of collective bargaining to suit
the UAW's funding practices. Termination insurance would
shift default risk away from union members and make it
unnecessary for the UAW to bargain for full funding.
Insuring pension benefits posed troublesome practical
problems, however, and union officials struggled with these
issues as they worked out the idea.
Part VI describes the Studebaker shutdown and
examines its role as the "focusing event" that pushed
termination insurance onto the policy-making agenda.
UAW officials began promoting termination insurance to
public officials and pension experts in 1962, but they had
limited success before Studebaker-Packard closed the plant
in South Bend. The shutdown provided an ideal opportunity
to get policy-makers to seriously consider termination
insurance. With assistance from Indiana Senator Vance
Hartke, UAW pension experts quickly turned the proposal
into legislation. When Hartke introduced "The Federal
Reinsurance of Private Pensions Act" in August 1964,
termination insurance moved securely onto the reform
agenda and Studebaker became, in the words of a Senate
staffer, "the most glorious story of failure in the business."'
I. "THE GREAT GOLD RUSH OF '49"
Although the number of private pension plans in the
United States increased twenty-fold in the decade after
Congress passed the Social Security Act of 1935, most plans
created in this period concentrated on high-compensation
employees for whom public retirement benefits were
thought to be inadequate. At the end of World War II about
20% of private-sector employees participated in a pension
plan. Only a fraction participated in a collectively bargained
plan. This state of affairs changed rapidly in the late 1940s
5. Projection of Pension Fund Activities 3 (Feb. 22, 1971) (Papers of
Harrison Williams, Box 127, no folder, Special Collections and Archives,
Rutgers University Libraries).
6. See Norman D. Cann, How the Commissioner Handles Pension Plans, 23
TAxEs 918, 918 (1945).
7. For a discussion of the growth of coverage, see ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE
ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 10-13 (1982). A study in 1948 by the Bureau of
National Affairs "found pension provisions in only 5 percent of collective
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when unions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) made retirement. benefits their
primary demand in collective bargaining. Together the
United Auto Workers and United Steelworkers unions led
what one cartoonist called "the Great Gold Rush of '49."'
This "gold rush" reshaped the private pension system by
securing coverage for millions of unionized employees,
including production workers at the Studebaker
Corporation and the Packard Motor Car Company.
CIO demands for retirement plans and employer
acquiescence in those demands grew out of the
demographics and organization of postwar labor markets.
During World War II many businesses encouraged older
workers not to retire, and some firms asked retirees to
return to work. As a result, a pension actuary observed in
1944, "[m]ost companies.., have a greater proportion of
men over [age sixty-five] in their service than at any time in
their history."9 The war also produced major gains in the
size and security of labor unions. At war's end, many older
workers were in a bargaining unit represented by a union.0
Finally, wartime inflation substantially diminished the
value of Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance."
With only Social Security benefits to support them, many
older workers did not want to leave the workforce. In
unionized firms, efforts to dismiss older workers provoked
grievances, strike threats, and litigation."
bargaining contracts." Donald F. Farwell, Bargaining on Pensions, in PENSIONS &
PROFIT SHARING 207 (3d ed. 1964). For discussion of the development of collectively
bargained pensions, see Jack Barbash, The Structure and Evolution of Union
Interests in Pensions, in SUBCOmi. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE J. ECONOIC COMA!.,
90TH CONG., OLD AGE INCOME ASSURANCE PART IV: EMPLOYMENT ASPECTS OF
PENSION PLANS 64-65 (Comm. Print 1967), and Leonard Lesser, Problems in
Pension Contributions and Benefits, in INDUS. REL. RES. ASSN, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FIF=H ANNUAL MEETING 86 (L. Reed Tripp ed., 1953).
8. See The Great Gold Rush of'49, in Pensions: Less Worry for Boss, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1949, at 39.
9. M.F. Lipton, Trends in Company Pension Plans, in NAT'L INDUS. CONF.
BOARD, STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY, No. 67, at 8 (1944).
10. See ROBERT H. ZEGER, AEICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985,
at 63-69, 92-94, 100-01 (1986).
11. STEVEN A. SASS, PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
120 (1997); see EUGENE STEUERLE & JOHN M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY
FORTHE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 92-94 (1994).
12. See F. Beatrice Brower, Postwar Pension Problems, 8 NATL INDUS. CONF.
BOARD MGM'T. REC. 362-63 (1946) (mentioning actions taken by the Steelworkers,
Auto Workers, and Mine Workers when employers attempted to retire union
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This combination of circumstances created problems for
employers and for unions. As Slichter, Healy, and
Livernash explain in their classic study, The Impact of
Collective Bargaining on Management, "Though unions
were not very active in seeking pension plans during the
war, they were indirectly magnifying the pension problem
for employers."" CIO unions bargained for seniority
systems that required an employer to lay off workers in
reverse order of seniority. These unions also negotiated
contractual provisions that allowed an employer to dismiss
workers only for cause. Because age did not constitute an
appropriate cause for discharge, "employers were faced with
the dilemma of what to do with older employees." 4 But it
was not only a dilemma for employers. Layoffs were
common in the heavy industries organized by CIO unions."
When workers were on layoff, jobs for older, long-service
employees came at the expense of unemployment for
younger, less senior union members. 6 This trade-off gave
union leaders a pragmatic as well as a humanitarian stake
in the retirement options available to older workers.
In 1946 a Congress controlled by the Democrats took
what the CIO's Committee on Social Security called "some
slight forward steps with respect to a few aspects of the
[Social Security] program, but left the basic and crying
needs still to be remedied." 8 When the Republicans took
Congress in the November 1946 election, a political
environment that was not friendly to public social programs
became pronouncedly more hostile. Within days of the
members who wished to remain at work); see also MELVIN K. BERS, UNION POLICY
AND THE OLDER WORKER 71-74 (1976).
13. SUMNER H. SLICOTER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 374 (1960).
14. Id.
15. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Pacific Ties: Industrial Relations and Employment
Systems in Japan and the United States Since 1900, in INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE 226-32 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Howell John
Harris eds., 1993).
16. The trade-off shows up most clearly in the fact that CIO unions negotiated
pension plans with compulsory retirement despite professed opposition to this
policy. See BERS, supra note 12, at 74-76; Lane Kirkland, Discussion, in INDUS.
REL. RES. ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 106 (L. Reed Tripp
ed., 1953); SLICHTER ET AL., supra note 13, at 389-90.
17. See BERS, supra note 12, at 83.
18. CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, FINAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE
EIGHTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 82 (1946).
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election, UAW president Walter Reuther told local union
leaders, "In the immediate future, security will be won for
our people only to the extent that the union succeeds in
obtaining such security through collective bargaining."9 As
if to endorse Reuther's forecast, on January 8, 1947, five
days after the new Republican Congress convened, a trial
examiner at the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
held that the Inland Steel Company had committed unfair
labor practices when it refused to negotiate with the
Steelworkers union about retirement practices and a
pension plan.2" This combination of demographics,
congressional politics, and a legal mandate to negotiate
pension issues prompted unions to pursue "social security"
in the private sector."
The signal event of the immediate post-war period was
the creation of the United Mine Workers Health and
Retirement Fund.22 Mine Workers president John L. Lewis
turned to the idea of a welfare and pension plan because it
promised to rationalize the industry and remedy the
deficiencies of company-sponsored medical programs.
Drawing on models developed by unions in the needle
trades, Lewis saw the fund as a way to induce older
employees to retire and, thus, smooth the transition to a
more mechanized and productive industry. Although Lewis
failed to secure such a plan in 1945, when he raised the
issue again in 1946 and struck to get it, the federal
government seized the mines and negotiated the fund he
sought.2
Lewis's success established a benchmark for other
unions, and pensions quickly became a standard demand in
19. Alan Derickson, Health Security for All? Social Unionism and Universal
Health Insurance, 1935-1958, 80 J. AAM. HIST. 1333, 1344 (1994); see also DAVID L.
STEBENNE, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG: NEW DEAL LIBERAL 63 (1996).
20. In re Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, 35 (7th Cir. 1948); see also F. Beatrice
Brower, A Significant Pension Ruling, 9 NAT'L INDUS. CONF. BOARD MGM'r. REC.
25-26 (1947).
21. See Murray W. Latimer, Social Security in Collective Bargaining, in
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 1, 3-
9 (Emanuel Stein ed., 1948); Barbash, supra note 7, at 63-67.
22. See SLICHTER ET AL., supra note 13, at 374-75; SASS, supra note 11, at 127-
29.
23. See MELVYN DUBOFSKY & WARREN VAN TINE, JOHN L. LEWIS: A BIOGRAPHY
330-32 (abridged ed. 1986); Richard P. Mulcahy, Serving the Union: The United
Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund, 1946-1978, at 17 (1988)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University) (on file with author).
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collective bargaining. 4 In September 1948 a federal appeals
court agreed with the NLRB that labor law required an
employer to bargain pension and retirement issues." Soon
thereafter the Auto Workers and Steelworkers moved
pensions to the top of their collective-bargaining agenda.26
The UAW demanded a retirement plan when negotiations
began at Ford in June 1949.27 The Steelworkers did the
same in negotiations with major firms in the industry.
When the steel negotiations broke down and threatened a
nationwide strike, President Harry Truman appointed a
fact-finding board to investigate the union's demands. On
September 10 the board issued a report that endorsed the
Steelworkers' demand for pensions." Less than three weeks
later, Ford and the UAW reached a path-breaking
agreement that committed Ford to establish a pension plan
for its hourly employees. After a strike, the steel
companies also gave in.' ° The report and the ensuing
bargaining settlements precipitated a "pension stampede,"
as CIO unions at other firms and in other sectors of the
economy battled to secure pensions.
The pension plans for production workers of the
Studebaker Corporation and the Packard Motor Car
Company were part of this "stampede." Officials from the
UAW International office and from Local 5 at Studebaker
began discussing pensions soon after the announcement
that Ford would create a plan. The precedent set at Ford
made it clear that Studebaker would establish a retirement
plan. The principal issue for collective bargaining was
whether the plan would follow the Ford pattern or the
pattern set by GM and Chrysler when they settled with the
union. 2 Bargaining in South Bend dragged on for several
24. See MARTIN HALPERN, UAW POLITICS IN THE COLD WAR ERA 187 (1988);
SASS, supra note 11, at 131-33.
25. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
26. See New Union Demands, FORTUNE, Jan. 1949, at 150; Turning Point,
FORTUNE, Apr. 1949, at 189; BENJAMIN M. SELEKMAN ET AL., PROBLEMIS IN LABOR
RELATIONS 324-30 (1950).
27. SELEKMAN ETAL., supra note 26, at 339-42.
28. Frederick H. Harbison & Robert C. Spencer, The Politics of Collective
Bargaining: The Post-War Record in Steel, 44 AM. POL. SCL REV. 705, 709
(1954); SASS, supra note 11, at 133.
29. SASS, supra note 11, at 135-36.
30. Harbison & Spencer, supra note 28, 709-10.
31. Pensions Still No. 1 Labor Problem, STEEL, Jan. 2, 1950, at 102.
32. Minutes, Re: Pension Plan (Jan. 31, 1950) (Collection of the Studebaker
690 [Vol. 49
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months as the parties waited out negotiations at GM and a
long strike at Chrysler, but Studebaker and Local 5 reached
agreement in June 1950."3 Packard took more persuading.
Workers at the firm's plant in Detroit struck for eleven
days, but in August 1950 Packard too agreed to establish a
retirement plan.4
Both Studebaker and Packard adopted a defined-benefit
pension plan patterned after GM's.35 The Studebaker plan
promised employees pension credit of $1.50 per month for
each year of service up to a maximum of thirty years. 6
Normal retirement age was sixty-five, but the plan's early
retirement provision allowed an employee with ten years of
service to retire at sixty. Retirement at sixty-five was
voluntary, but employees were forced to retire at sixty-
National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1834, Pension Plans-Minutes
of Meetings with Union folder).
33. Chrysler's Hundred Days, FORTUNE, June 1950, at 70-72; GM Gambles
on Peace with Union, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 2, 1950, at 38-39; J.D.
Hill, The President's Column, STUDEBAKER LOCAL No. 5 WKLY. NEWS, June 14,
1950, at 1.
34. See PACKARD MOTOR CAR CO., 1950 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1951).
35. "In a defined-benefit plan, benefits are established in advance by a
formula, and employer contributions are treated as the variable factor." DAN M.
MCGRL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALs OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 201 (7th ed. 1996)
[hereinafter FUNDAMIENTALS]. The Studebaker plan, for example, promised
participants a pension equal to $1.50 per month per year of service for up to
thirty years of service. Studebaker agreed to contribute the amount necessary
to pay the benefit provided by the plan. In contrast, in a defined-contribution
plan the employer's contribution is fixed and the benefit is variable. A defined-
contribution plan "provides an individual account for each participant" and
"defines the amount of contribution to be added to each participant's account."
The benefit an employee receives at retirement depends "solely on the amount
contributed to the participant's account and on any expense, investment, and
forfeitures allocated to that account." Id. at 247. For the basic terms of the GM
pension agreement, see Wage Chronology No. 9: General Motors Corp., 72
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 405, 406 (1951).
36. Studebaker's 1950 collective-bargaining agreement with the UAW also
guaranteed a retiring employee a minimum monthly benefit including the
employee's Social Security Old-Age and Survivor's Insurance benefit (OASI) of
$4 per year of service, up to twenty-five years of service. The minimum
retirement benefit was fully integrated with OASI in that the minimum benefit
did not increase when the OASI benefit increased. If the OASI benefit rose, the
payment obligation of the pension plan decreased by the amount of the increase
in the OASI benefit. Pension Agreement between Studebaker Corp. and UAW
Local No. 5, at 19, 28-29 (June 23, 1950) [hereinafter 1950 Pension Plan]
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
1825, Pension Plan Materials).
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eight." Studebaker agreed to finance the plan by making
contributions to a pension trust. As in the majority of plans,
Studebaker did not accept direct contractual liability for
paying retirement benefits. The plan promised to pay
pensions to retirees. Studebaker promised to make regular
contributions to the trust. Studebaker's liability was limited
to making the trust contributions called for by its collective-
bargaining agreement."
II. BARGAINING RETIREMENT SECURITY AND INSECURITY
In June 1950 the UAW's monthly newsletter claimed
that the collective-bargaining victories of 1949 and 1950
"laid the foundation" on which the union would build "a full
measure of security and dignity" for older workers.39 But
"security and dignity" were not free. When a union
negotiates a retirement plan, it has to balance benefits,
costs, and risks. To pay retirement benefits, an employer
must divert money that might otherwise be paid as wages.
The size of the financial commitment depends on, among
other factors, the liberality of pension benefits and the
requirements employees must satisfy to receive benefits.
The UAW negotiated contractual provisions that paid
relatively generous pensions to retiring employees. To hold
down costs, the union agreed to strict qualifications for
benefit entitlement. When independent automakers ran
into financial problems in the mid 1950s, it became
apparent that this balancing of benefits, costs, and risks left
younger employees at risk of losing their pension.
When the UAW won pension plans from Studebaker,
Packard, and other independent automakers, these firms
appeared to be healthy. The end of World War II had
unleashed a huge consumer demand for automobiles, and
most independents responded effectively to the peacetime
37. Id. at 17, 18-20, 34-35.
38. See id. at 8-9, 45-47. For a discussion of provisions relieving sponsors
from direct liability for benefits, see DAN M. McGILL, FULFILLING PENSION
EXPECTATIONS 275 (1962); SASS, supra note 11, at 189.
39. UAW-CIO Leads the Way, 14 UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKER, June 1950, at
4.
40. See DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, STUDEBAKER: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN
AMERICAN CORPORATION 123 (1996); William B. Harris, Last Stand of the Auto
Independents? FORTUNE, Dec. 1954, at 114, 115.
692 [Vol. 49
ORIGINS OF ERISA
economy. 1 Several even developed new models before the
Big Three. For these reasons, independent automakers
captured a substantially larger share of passenger car sales
than they had held before the war. "The group,
manufacturing such familiar makes as Studebaker,
Packard, Nash, Hudson, and Willys," a journalist observed,"accounted for about 10 per cent of the passenger-car
market before the war, and after Kaiser-Frazer Corp. got
into production in 1946 the independents' share of the
market was built to a high of 18.5 per cent., 42 Hudson,
Nash, Packard, and Studebaker gradually lost market
share after 1946, but "unit production and sales expanded
each year to a postwar peak in 1950; and throughout the
period, the share of new car registrations held by their
makes exceeded the share which they had held in 1941."43
Although it did not become clear for several years, the
independents' place in the auto industry was very
precarious. During the Korean War, economic controls
allowed the independents to maintain relatively stable
shares of production and sales, and several profited from
defense contracts. But 1953 was a turning point that
brought cutbacks in defense production, the end of
production controls, and recession. "Car output expanded
rapidly to 3.3 million units in the second and third quarters
of 1953, compared to 2.1 million units in the same period in
1952.'" Then the postwar seller's market came to an end.
When Ford and General Motors responded by maintaining
high levels of production and cutting prices, smaller
competitors could not follow. The independents' share of
domestic auto production fell from over 14% in 1952 to 7.1%
in the final quarter of 1953.45 Sales volume fell as well, and
profits shrunk or disappeared. Nash, Hudson, and Packard
showed losses over the second half of 1953 and Studebaker
showed a much-reduced profit of $600,000.
The dramatic reversal in the automobile market gave
new force to merger initiatives that had circulated among
41. See CHARLES E. EDWARDS, DYNAMICS OF THE UNITED STATES AUTOMOBILE
INDUSTRY 13 (1965).
42. Harris, supra note 40, at 114.
43. EDWARDS, supra note 41, at 16.
44. LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY SINCE 1945, at 13
(1971).
45. Id. at 14 tbl. 2.1.
46. Id. at 14; see also JAMES A. WARD, FALL OF PACKARD 110-11 (1995).
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the independents since the late 1940s." Kaiser-Frazer
purchased the assets of Willys-Overland in May 1953, "four
months before the collapse of the market."8 In the second
half of 1953, Packard talked merger with Studebaker,
Nash, and Hudson, while Nash and Hudson officials talked
with each other.49 Nash and Hudson announced a deal in
January 1954. In April they merged to create the American
Motors Corporation." The "shotgun wedding" of Packard
and Studebaker followed in October 1954.51
In the wake of these mergers, managers consolidated
operations to reduce costs. As they did so, weaknesses in
UAW retirement plans became visible. Sales and
shutdowns of production facilities demonstrated that there
was a critical difference between accruing credit in a
pension plan and qualifying for a pension. Corporate
restructuring revealed that the lack of vesting in UAW
retirement plans exposed workers to substantial levels of
"forfeiture risk.",
2
The plans the UAW negotiated in 1949 and 1950 gave
employees pension credit based on a flat-dollar amount and
period of service-for example, $1.50 per month for up to
thirty years of service. But accruing credit did not entitle a
worker to receive a pension. The Studebaker plan
specifically stated that "no employee" would receive a
"vested" or contractual right "except such rights, if any, as
may accrue to him upon retirement as provided in the
Plan."" In other words, an employee did not receive a
legally enforceable right to a pension until he qualified to
retire under the terms of the plan. If he quit or lost his job
before he became eligible to retire, he forfeited his pension
credit.54
47. See CRITCHLOW, supra note 40, at 133-34.
48. Harris, supra note 40, at 206.
49. See WARD, supra note 46, at 144-48.
50. Harris, supra note 40, at 206; see WARD, supra note 46, at 148.
51. WARD, supra note 46, at 158. When the two firms merged, they became
the Studebaker-Packard Corporation. In April 1962, Packard was dropped from
the corporate name. Id. at 256. For the sake of simplicity, I refer to the firm as
the Studebaker-Packard Corporation.
52. I owe this formulation to John Langbein.
53. 1950 Pension Plan, supra note 36, at 49 (emphasis added).
54. See Evan K. Rowe & Thomas H. Paine, Pension Plans Under Collective
Bargaining, 76 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 237 (1953); F. Beatrice Brower, Pension
Plans and Their Administration, in NAT'L INDUS. CONF. BOARD, STUDIES IN
PERSONNEL PoLICY, No. 149, at 32 (1955). For a general discussion of problems
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The lack of vesting in UAW plans was not an oversight.
Union bargainers appreciated the importance of vesting,
but they also understood that it was a significant factor in
the cost of a pension plan. A more liberal vesting provision
means that more employees will qualify for benefits. If the
amount of funds available for pensions is limited, more
liberal vesting and lower levels of forfeitures require lower
levels of benefits to employees who do qualify.5 Conversely,
a plan with limited resources can pay higher pensions if
fewer employees qualify. Seen in this light, the strict
vesting requirements, like other features of UAW pension
plans, reflected a conscious choice about budgeting the
limited resources available to finance a retirement plan.
UAW pension specialist Leonard Lesser explained the
trade-off in 1952. When an employer and union establish a
retirement plan, Lesser observed, they have to choose
"whether to allocate the bulk of the limited funds to assure
maximum retirement security to older workers at the cost
of generally foregoing [sic], for the present, such desirable
features as vesting of benefits, transfer of rights and other
provisions directed to the special needs of younger
workers." 6 Demographics and seniority systems led unions
to bargain for relatively liberal benefits for employees who
were at or near retirement age. As Lane Kirkland, then an
AFL-CIO benefits specialist, observed in 1956, "the
immediate pension needs of those workers who were
already approaching or had passed the retirement age...
had to be given priority" over "liberal vesting" provisions
that would protect younger employees. 7 More generous
pensions would produce more retirements and, thus, more
job security for younger workers. But liberal retirement
benefits also came at the expense of greater risk of
forfeiture for younger employees.
The Kaiser-Frazer Corporation provided a compelling
illustration of forfeiture risk when it sold its principal
created by lack of vesting at this time, see Will Pension Plans Go Sour? U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1954, at 79-81.
55. See WILLIAMi W. FELLERS, Pension Costs and Cost Experience, in
PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING 157 (1953); WILLIAM F. MARPLEs, ACTUARIAL
ASPECTS OF PENSION SECURITY 17, 54-55 (1965).
56. Lesser, supra note 7, at 89.
57. Lane Kirkland, Pensions and the Pensioner, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
YORK UNiVERSITY NINTH ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 147, 153 (Emanuel
Stein ed., 1956).
20011 695
696 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
production facility in November 1953. Kaiser was founded
after World War II, so few of its employees had long periods
of service. 8 The Kaiser plan, like the Studebaker plan, gave
employees no rights "excepting the right of the employee to
retirement benefits or retirement disability benefits as
provided [in the plan]. "  Under this provision, employees
forfeited their benefit accruals when Kaiser closed the
plant. Although the plan also said that employees with five
years of service could receive benefits if the plan
terminated, Kaiser continued to operate the plan for
employees at several smaller facilities. The large number of
forfeitures and small number of remaining employees
caused the plan to be overfunded, that is, to have more
assets than were necessary to meet its pension obligations."
Disgruntled former employees sued unsuccessfully to force
plan trustees to terminate the pension trust and distribute
the assets.6'
Less than a year after the Kaiser shutdown, American
Motors announced that it would move its Hudson assembly
lines from Detroit to Milwaukee and Kenosha, Wisconsin,
where the firm assembled its Nash models.62 When these
lines shut down in October 1954, AMC allowed some
58. Some employees had retired by 1953, apparently based on service with
corporate predecessors. See David A. LaMoreaux, Kaiser's Terminated Fund-A
Case Study, 8 PENSION & WELFARE NEWS, Sept. 1972, at 72-73.
59. George v. Haber, 72 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1955) (quoting Article X of the
plan).
60. See Report on Partial Termination of Kaiser Motors UAW-CIO
Retirement Plan for Benefit of Employees on Lay-Off From Willow Run and
Jackson Plants (June 30, 1953) (Murray W. Latimer Papers, Box 35, Kaiser
Motors Corporation Retirement Trust Fund 6/30/53 Valuation, Dissolution
folder, Special Collections Department, The Gelman Library, The George
Washington University).
61. George, 72 N.W.2d 121. Several years after the Willow Run plant closed,
the terms of the retirement plan were amended to allow employees with five or
more years of service to receive a pension. Even after this expansion of benefit
eligibility, only about 40% of the employees covered by the plan met the
requirement. See Letter from Murray W. Latimer to Merton Bernstein (Oct. 30,
1961) (Murray W. Latimer Papers, Box 35, Kaiser Motors Corporation
Retirement Trust Fund Correspondence 1960 folder, Special Collections
Department, The Gelman Library, The George Washington University); Letter
from Murray W. Latimer to Professor William Haber (Feb. 29, 1960) (Murray
W. Latimer Papers, Box 35, Kaiser Motors Corporation Retirement Trust Fund
Correspondence 1960 folder, Special Collections Department, The Gelman
Library, The George Washington University).
62. Hudson Assembly to Leave Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1954, at 22.
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employees to transfer to the Nash plants.63 But about 3000
Hudson workers who did not transfer were dropped from
the company seniority lists. The Hudson plan also did not
include a vesting provision, and in most UAW plans,
including Hudson's, workers forfeited their pension credit
when they were dropped from seniority lists. Thus, many
union members who had long periods of service at Hudson
were threatened with forfeiture of their pension credit. The
UAW avoided this by negotiating an agreement that
provided pensions for Hudson workers.65
The Kaiser and Hudson shutdowns led the UAW to
push for vesting in its next round of collective bargaining.
In 1955 the union negotiated plan terms that vested an
employee in 100% of his pension accruals when he
accumulated ten years of service after age twenty-nine.66
The vesting provision provided an additional increment of
security for employees who participated in a UAW
retirement plan. As the union's newsletter put it, the
vesting provision established the "history-making principle"
that "inactive, laid-off and displaced workers" would not
forfeit their pension credits. Events at Studebaker-
Packard soon demonstrated that vested benefits were less
secure than they seemed.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION FINANCE IN A
DECLINING FIRM
More liberal vesting provisions allow more employees to
earn a legal right to a pension. But payment of retirement
benefits depends on more than the existence of a legal
claim. There also must be money to pay the claim. Ideally,
an employer should fund pension obligations in advance of
payment by setting aside assets as employees earn pension
63. UAW Wins Preferential Hiring for Unemployed Hudson Workers, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE WORKER, Feb. 1955, at 7.
64. Telephone Interview with Leonard Woodcock, former UAW President
(Oct. 25, 1994); Will Pension Plans Go Sour?, supra note 54, at 80.
65. See UAW Expected to Offer 'Concessions' to Studebaker, Kaiser in Line
with American Motors Agreement, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1955, at 3; It's Full
Pattern for AMC; Pensions for Hudson Force, UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKER,
Sept. 1955, at 4.
66. See The 1955 Ford and General Motors Union Contracts, 78 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 875, 880 (1955).
67. It's Full Pattern for AMC, supra note 65, at 4.
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credit. In fact, employers and unions usually negotiated a
retirement plan under circumstances that made it
infeasible for a firm to immediately fund all of a plan's
obligations. Virtually all defined-benefit pension plans came
into being with benefit obligations that far outstripped the
assets set aside to pay those obligations. Furthermore, in
collectively-bargained plans, employers and unions created
additional unfunded liability each time they increased
retirement benefits. Funding these liabilities required a
large, long-term financial commitment. If a firm ran into
hard times, as Studebaker-Packard did, the expense of an
underfunded pension plan could be an onerous and
potentially fatal burden.
When Studebaker and Packard merged in 1954, they
were in poor financial condition. Packard historian James
Ward reports that the "new firm was threatened by
bankruptcy even before it was born. The companies were
losing money at an unbelievable rate in the third quarter of
1954: Studebaker's loss was $13,825,000 and Packard...
failed to meet its expenses by $11,755,000. ' s Managers
believed operations at Packard's Detroit plant were
relatively sound. They saw problems at Studebaker,
especially its labor costs, as the main obstacle to the firm's
survival.' 9 Management spent much of 1955 negotiating for
concessions in South Bend. When Studebaker workers
narrowly ratified a new collective-bargaining agreement in
January 1956, management won changes in work rules that
substantially reduced labor costs.7"
But just as the company secured gains at Studebaker,
Packard collapsed. Packard had moved into a new assembly
plant in 1954 but experienced delays getting production
underway. Once production started, there were quality
control problems. By the time the facility got "up to speed,
however, demand for Packards' slackened."71 It never
returned. In the first two months of 1956, sales of Packard
models fell 67% from the 1955 level.72 Massive losses led the
68. WARD, supra note 46, at 157-58.
69. Id. at 168.
.70. See id. at 173; Stephen Amberg, Triumph of Industrial Orthodoxy: The
Collapse of Studebaker-Packard Corporation, in ON THE LINE: ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF AuTo WORK 204 (Nelson Lichtenstein & Stephen Meyer eds., 1989).
71. WARD, supra note 46, at 177.
72. Id. at 212.
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firm to cease production at the plant in June.3 Studebaker-
Packard teetered on the edge of bankruptcy for much of
1956. It narrowly averted liquidation by selling its defense
business and leasing several manufacturing facilities to
Curtiss-Wright Corporation for about $37 million. '4
Henceforth, Studebaker-Packard's U.S. production
would be in South Bend. The plant in South Bend was not
healthy, but with $37 million and a new labor contract,
managers believed they could turn the firm around. It
would be an uphill battle, though, and the firm soon
encountered a financial problem that often struck declining
firms with an underfunded pension plan.
An employer has a variety of options for financing the
obligations of a defined-benefit pension plan. The simplest
is to operate the plan pay-as-you-go. That is, the employer
makes payments directly to retirees "in the same manner
as payroll."75 Accountants and actuaries have long
recommended (and federal law now requires) a more
prudent approach. As Dan McGill and his collaborators
write, "The conventional approach to financing pension
benefits is for the employer (and employees, if the plan is
contributory) to set aside the necessary funds with a trustee
or insurance company before the benefits become payable." 6
Ideally, an employer should set aside at least enough each
year to finance the benefits employees accrue in that year."
This policy protects employees because payment of benefits
earned in the past will not depend on the employer's future
economic performance.78 From the employer's perspective,
advance-funding means that costs attributable to service
that employees performed in the past will not be a charge
against future production.
Newly created defined-benefit plans generally did not
fit this ideal. Most businesses did not get around to creating
a retirement plan until the firm had elderly employees
whom managers or union leaders wished to retire. As a
UAW actuary put it, "The primary purpose of a retirement
plan is not only to provide pensions, but to provide them
73. See id. at 239.
74. Id. at 243.
75. FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 589.
76. Id. at 590.
77. Under a variety of actuarial funding methods, employer contributions
may exceed the value of a plan's legal liability for pension benefits.
78. See FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 592.
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now."79 The appeal of a defined-benefit plan was that it
could immediately provide relatively generous benefits to
employees who were at or near retirement age. A defined-
benefit plan did this by giving employees credit toward a
pension for "past service," that is, for service performed
before the employer adopted the plan."
Granting credit for past service facilitated retirement of
older workers, but it also created default risk. If a firm sets
aside resources as employees earn pension credit, there will
be little risk that a retirement plan will cease operation
without enough assets to meet its obligations. But firms
that created a defined-benefit plan usually could not do this
because workers received pension credit for years of service
before there was a plan to fund. As a result, most defined-
benefit plans came into being with a large unfunded
liability, sometimes called "past-service liability." One
expert likened past-service liability to "the price [the plan
sponsor] must pay for neglecting to initiate a pension plan




The past-service liability of a new defined-benefit plan
was often very large. After U.S. Steel negotiated a
retirement plan with the Steelworkers union in 1949,
management decided to make pensions available to the
firm's other employees as well. In testimony to Congress in
1950, consulting actuary George Buck estimated U.S.
Steel's "total past service cost for present employees" to be
$560 million.2 Ford's initial liability under the plan it
negotiated with the UAW was put at $200 million."'
79. Memorandum from Max Bloch to James Brindle 4 (June 17, 1958)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Bloch to Brindle] (UAW Social Security
Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession date Mar. 23, 1978,
Box 4 of 7, Staff Collective Bargaining folder, Archives of Labor and Urban
Affairs, Wayne State University) (emphasis in original).
80. Robert Paul emphasized the importance of this point. Telephone
Interview with Robert Paul, former President, Segal Company (June 15, 1999);
see also Frank L. Griffin, Jr., The Private Pension Hullabaloo, PENSION &
WELFARE NEWS, Apr. 1967, at 18; M.B. Folsom, Old Age on the Balance Sheet,
143 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 399, 403 (1929).
81. A.J. Meuche, Past Service Benefits, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
UNiVERSITY TENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 75, (Emanuel Stein ed.,
1957); see also FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 520-22.
82. December 1949 Steel Price Increases: Hearings Before J. Comm. on the
Econ. Rep., 81st Cong. 27, 44-45 (2d Sess. 1950).
83. See Peter Drucker, The Mirage of Pensions, HARPER'S, Mar. 1950, at 33.
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Studebaker's past-service liability was smaller-about $18
million-but Studebaker was a much smaller firm than
Ford or U.S. Steel.84 Packard also assumed past-service
liability when it created its pension plan. And since
Packard had an older workforce than Studebaker, it
probably had a relatively larger past-service liability.85
An employer had to finance past-service liability as well
as liability based on future service out of revenue generated
after creation of the plan. How these costs were allocated
over time depended on the actuarial-cost method a firm
adopted. Different actuarial-cost methods produced
different patterns of contributions and, thus, gave plan
sponsors discretion over the incidence of pension costs. In
the steel industry, which had a relatively older workforce
and high past-service liability, many firms adopted what
came to be known as "interest-only" funding."6 Under this
approach the employer contributed the expense attributable
to retirement benefits earned in the current year plus
interest on the plan's past-service liability. This funding
schedule, which was the minimum an employer could
contribute and receive favorable tax treatment, lightened
the initial expense of a pension plan, but a plan financed in
this manner would never have enough assets to meet all of
its liability.
87
The demographics in the auto industry were less
constraining than in the steel industry, and the UAW
placed more emphasis on "sound" funding than did the
Steelworkers. A UAW negotiator told Studebaker
84. Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private
Pension Plan Reform Movement, in LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 69.
85. Private Pension Plans: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of J.
Econ. Comm., 89th Cong. 117 (2d Sess. 1966) [hereinafter 1966 JEC Hearings]
(statement of Clifford M. MacMillan); Chrysler's Hundred Days, FORTUNE, June
1950, at 71. The pension plans at U.S. Steel, Studebaker, and Ford were
integrated with Social Security. For this reason, when Congress increased
Social Security benefits in August 1950, the past-service liability of these plans
was reduced. See SASS, supra note 11, at 136-37.
86. For a discussion of the funding practices in several steel industry plans
see George B. Buck, How Much Do Employee Benefits Cost?, in NAT'L INDUS.
CONFERENCE BD., HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS: STUDIES IN PERSONNEL POLICY, No.
103, at 45-47 (1950). For a discussion of "interest only" fimding, see DORRANCE
BRONSON, CONCEPTS OF ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS IN PENSION PLANS 97-101 (1957).
87. FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 533-34.
88. See SASS, supra note 11, at 135; see also Willard Weiss, Funding
Practices Under Labor Negotiated Pension Plans, in 2 PROCEEDINGS:
CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 73-75 (1952).
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representatives at a bargaining session in January 1950,
"we believe that it's pretty clear in the minds of everybody
now that the question of building a sound pension plan is
just as important as getting a pension plan." 9 In fact, the
"main issue" in the UAW's 104-day strike at Chrysler in
1950 was whether Chrysler would establish a trust and
fund its pension obligations in advance.9
But "sound" funding did not mean "full" funding. Even
if it were feasible for an employer to pay the entire past-
service liability when it created a retirement plan, the tax
laws discouraged this course of action. An employer's
annual deduction for pension contributions was limited to
the cost attributed to current accruals plus 10% of the past-
service liability. In other words, if a firm created a plan
with past-service liability of $1,000,000, it could deduct the
cost of current accruals plus $100,000 in each year until the
past-service liability was paid off. If an employer
contributed more than this, the excess was "carried forward
and deducted in future years."9' The unpaid balance of a
plan's past-service liability accrued interest, so the shortest
period over which an employer could pay off past-service
liability and deduct its entire contribution each year was
about twelve years.9"
UAW plans called for an employer to pay off past-
service liability over a considerably longer period-
commonly thirty years.93 Like the vesting requirements in
UAW plans, the funding provisions reflected a decision to
budget limited resources in a manner that provided
relatively liberal retirement benefits. By lengthening the
period for paying off past-service liability, a plan could
devote less of the employer's current contribution to past-
service liability and more to current retirement benefits."
89. Minutes, Re: Pension Plan, supra note 32, at 1 (emphasis in original).
90. BRONSON, supra note 86, at 27; see Federal Reinsurance of Private
Pension Plans: Hearing on S. 1575 Before Senate Comm. on Fin. 48 (2d Sess.
1966) (statement of Walter Reuther); see also SASS, supra note 11, at 184.
91. William N. Haddad, Impact of Tax Policy on Private Pensions, in
PENSIONS: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS 70-71 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1955).
92. See John B. St. John, Financing a Pension Plan, in PENSIONS & PROFIT
SHARING 107 (3d ed. 1964).
93. See J. Perham Stanley, Pension Plans Negotiated by the UAW-CIO, 77
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 13, 14-15 (1954).
94. See George B. Buck, Jr., Actuarial Solvency of a Pension Plan, in
PENSIONS: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS 130 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1955).
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UAW officials later compared the practice to a home
mortgage:
[I]n the same way that many persons would not be able to own
their own homes except through the creation of mortgage type
debt, most private pension plans could not provide an adequate
level of benefits if the mechanism of gradually funding the cost of
prior service credits were not used.
9 5
But higher retirement benefits came at the expense of
greater risk. Until the employer paid off the mortgage,
employees faced default risk.
The funding schedule in UAW collective-bargaining
agreements projected that a pension plan would eventually
attain full funding. In practice, this almost never occurred.
The reason was that the funding schedule did not take into
account that the union would negotiate higher benefits in
future rounds of collective bargaining. As noted above,
UAW pension plans calculated an employee's pension by
multiplying his years of service times a flat-dollar amount.
For a retirement plan with a flat-dollar benefit formula, the
IRS calculated an employer's maximum deductible
contribution based on the current formula. This
discouraged employers from contributing enough funds to
meet higher benefit levels that were likely to apply in the
future. Yet the UAW negotiated an increase in benefits in
each successive round of collective bargaining. The formula
in the Studebaker plan went from $1.50 per month per year
of service in 1950 to $1.75 in 1953 and then to $2.25 in
1955.9'
One effect of these benefit improvements was to
counteract inflation, but the increases went well beyond the
rate of inflation. The union sought higher real benefit levels
because more generous pensions induced more workers to
95. Public Reinsurance for Private Pension Plans, attached to Memorandum
from Howard Young to Nat Weinberg 2 (Oct. 23, 1962) (UAW Research
Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession No. 646, dated June
3, 1974, Box 12, UAW Social Security Department: Howard Young
Correspondence and Reports 1962-1967 folder, Archives of Labor and Urban
Affairs, Wayne State University).
96. See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 56
(1989); see also JOHN TURNER & NoIuYASu WATANABE, PRIVATE PENSION
POLICIES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRmIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 98-99 (1995).




retire voluntarily before reaching the age for mandatory
retirement. This meant less reliance on mandatory
retirement, which was unpopular with older workers, and
more employment security for younger employees."
But benefit improvements also reduced the level of
funding in UAW retirement plans. When the union
bargained for higher pensions, it commonly demanded an
increase in the flat-dollar formula that applied to past
service. This created additional unfunded liability that had
to be financed out of future revenues.99 The tax laws allowed
an employer to fund past-service liability created by a plan
amendment over the same term-about twelve years-that
applied to the initial liability when a plan was created.
UAW contracts commonly called for a firm to amortize the
liability on a thirty-year schedule from the date of the
benefit increase. 00
The decision to amortize past-service liability meant
that an employer's contribution to a UAW retirement plan
had two parts. One part reflected the expense attributable
to the current year; the other reflected the cost of retiring
the plan's past-service liability.' For example, the pension
agreement Studebaker and the UAW negotiated in 1950
called for Studebaker to contribute the cost attributable to
the current year plus an additional amount that would
98. See Melvin Y. Bers, Equity and Strategy in Union Retirement Policy, 4
INDUS. REL. 43-45 (1965). For figures on mandatory and normal retirements at
GM, Ford, and Chrysler, see Charles E. Odell, The Case for Early Retirement, 4
INDUS. REL. 16 tbl.1 (1965).
99. For an early recognition of this problem, see Memorandum from Nat
Weinberg to Walter Reuther (Nov. 19, 1951) (United Auto Workers President's
Office: Walter Reuther Collection, Box 150, Folder 5, Archives of Labor and
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University). For discussion of this issue, see
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 522, and SASS, supra note 11, at 185-86.
100. Studebaker-Packard's 1953 agreement required it to fund its new past-
service liability over a thirty-year period from the date the liability was created:
in other words, by June, 1 1983. The past-service liability under the 1950
pension agreement would continue to be finded on the schedule under the 1950
plan-by 1980. See Supplemental Pension Agreement 1 (June 1, 1953),
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
1834, "Pension Plan-Hourly Rated" folder). The pension agreement for 1955
established a new amortization schedule pursuant to which all past-service
liability (including liability created in 1950 and 1953) would be funded by 1985.
See Exhibit "A," Supplemental Agreement (Pension Plan) (Nov. 9, 1955),
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
3725, Exhibit A-Pension Plan Agreement folder).
101. FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 35, at 534-35.
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amortize the plan's past-service liability in level annual
installments "over a period of not more than 30 years from
the effective date of the plan."
10 2
Payments to amortize past-service liability were
tolerable for a stable or growing firm, but they became
increasingly burdensome as a firm declined and its
operations contracted. 10 3 The shutdown of the Packard plant
reduced the scale of Studebaker-Packard's operations, but it
did not significantly affect the contributions the firm made
to amortize past-service liability. For 1956, Studebaker-
Packard contributed $1,773,397 on behalf of Packard
employees. Of this amount, $1,157,268 was "past service
cost" and $616,129 was for current accruals.0 For 1957, the
first full year that Packard was out of production, the
contribution on behalf of Packard workers was $1,012,610.
Only $36,866 represented liability for current accruals. The
remaining $975,744 funded the Packard past-service
liability." With Packard out of production, this cost would
be born by the South Bend plant. Of course, South Bend
continued to bear the expense of the past-service liability
attributable to Studebaker employees. 10'
The immediate result of the Packard shutdown, then,
was a significant increase in hourly pension costs. "[Tihe
cost for 1956," an executive told Local 5 at Studebaker, "has
been established at 23.4 cents per hour."' 7 'You will be
interested to know," he continued, "that an estimate of the
cost for 1957 is 28.9 cents per hour," an increase of more
than 23%."'5 When CIO unions bargained for retirement and
insurance plans in 1949 and 1950, the combined cost was
102. 1950 Pension Plan, supra note 36, at 8-9.
103. See SASS, supra note 11, at 206.
104. Letter from Preston C. Bassett to Robert E. Bryar (Apr. 1, 1957)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
3725, Pension Plans-General Correspondence folder).
105. Actuarial Report by Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc. for
Studebaker-Packard Corp., UAW-CIO Pension Plan tbl. 57-4 (June 24, 1958)
(UAW Local 5 Collection, Box 28, Pension Plan-1956-1958 folder, Archives of
Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University).
106. See Memorandum from W.P. Wray to C.M. MacMillan (Mar. 24, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
710, Fringe Benefits Costs folder).
107. Letter from C.M. MacMillan to J.D. Hill (Aug. 27, 1957) (Collection of





estimated to be about 100 an hour.'0 9 In 1957 the cost of
Packard past-service liability alone threatened to exceed
100 an hour."0 And this was a long-term obligation. As a
company executive noted, it "would be a continuing
obligation.., amounting to approximately $1,000,000 per
year over the next twenty-seven years, even though no
employees covered by the Detroit labor contract are still
employed by the company." "
IV. THE TERMINATION AND DEFAULT OF THE PACKARD
PENSION PLAN
Studebaker-Packard's dire financial condition convinced
managers that the firm could no longer bear the cost of
Packard retirement benefits. Company executives decided
to shed the liability by terminating the pension plan as it
applied to Packard employees. Federal labor law and
collective-bargaining agreements made this a complicated
course of action, but company officials perceived a conflict of
interest at the UAW that worked to their advantage. With
Packard out of production, Studebaker workers paid for
Packard retirement benefits. Company executives devised a
strategy that trapped the UAW International Union
between the conflicting interests of the local unions at
Studebaker and Packard. With assistance from Local 5 at
Studebaker, the company terminated the plan for Packard
employees in September 1958.
Studebaker-Packard lost less money in 1957 than in
1956, but its competitive position continued to deteriorate.
In 1957 the firm built 82,000 cars and trucks in the United
States. This was a decline from production in South Bend in
1956, not to mention the combined production of the
109. See Frederick H. Harbison, The General Motors-United Auto Workers
Agreement of 1950, 58 J. POL. EcoN. 397, 401 (1950).
110. In 1958, hourly employees in South Bend worked slightly less than
eight million hours. If the $931,000 per year figure calculated by Studebaker's
actuaries is used, the cost of amortizing Packard's past-service liability would
have exceeded 11.5o per hour. See Studebaker-Packard Corp., Base Wages and
Fringe Benefits-Hourly Rated Employees for the Calendar year 1958 (Aug. 11,
1961) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
Negotiations 1961, notebook No. 91.51.188F, Costs tab).
111. Memorandum from M.L. Milligan (Aug. 22, 1958) (Collection of the
Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Studebaker-Packard




Studebaker and Packard divisions."' In August 1957
executives began investigating ways to "minimize" the
liability for Packard retirement benefits."' Initially they
considered freezing benefits at the current level. In other
words, Packard employees would not gain when the firm
granted benefit improvements to employees at Studebaker.
But while this approach would not increase costs, the firm
would remain obligated to pay off the Packard past-service
liability."' Managers abandoned this option when the firm
had another brush with bankruptcy.
1958 was a recession year, and Studebaker-Packard's
production fell again. In the fall the firm was to make the
first payments on $55 million of long-term debt, but it could
not pay."' Under an agreement announced in August,
Studebaker-Packard avoided liquidation by refinancing its
debt."6 This turn of events pushed executives toward a
more drastic approach to pension liability. Late in 1957 or
early in 1958 they decided to terminate the pension plan as
it applied to Packard employees."' This course of action
would completely eliminate the obligation for Packard
retirement benefits. It went without saying, however, that
the UAW would fight an effort to walk away from union
members at Packard. Recognizing this, company officials
planned their actions with care.
112. See Memorandum on Studebaker Corporation tbl.ll (Oct. 24, 1963),
attached to Letter from Emily Rosdolsky to Raymond H. Berndt (Oct. 24, 1963)
(UAW President's Office: Walter Reuther Collection, Box 168, folder 7, Archives
of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University).
113. Memorandum from M.L. Milligan to A.J. Porta (Aug. 27, 1957) (Collection
of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 710,
Administration of Studebaker-Packard Corporation UAW-AFL-CIO Pension Plan
Agreement folder).
114. Letter from S.B. Feuer to Royall Victor, Jr. (Oct. 22, 1957) (Collection of
the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 710,
Administration of Studebaker-Packard Corporation UAW-AFL-CIO Pension Plan
Agreement folder); Memorandum from C.J. McNerney to C.M. MacMillan, S.B.
Feuer, & W.P. Wray (n.d.), (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum,
South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local 190 notebook, Minutes tab) (discussing
1957 trip to Detroit).
115. See Richard Hammer, Welcome, Sherwood Egbert, FORTUNE, Dec. 1961, at
158.
116. See New Try for S-P, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 9, 1958, at 32; Studebaker-
Packard Bets It All, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 6, 1958, at 148, 150, 152.
117. Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan to H.E. Churchill 2 (Apr. 25, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
1290, Local 190 folder).
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The termination strategy required management to
navigate several legal obstacles. Studebaker-Packard had
separate collective-bargaining agreements with Local 190
at Packard and Local 5 at Studebaker. Local 190's contracts
ran through June 30, 1958, Local 5's through August 31.
The firm had to maintain the retirement plan for the
duration of these agreements, so managers could not take
action until September 1.118 The company also had duties
under federal labor law. As noted above, the NLRB had
held that pension and retirement issues were "mandatory"
subjects of collective bargaining."9 This meant that if
employees were unionized, their employer could not
unilaterally modify a retirement plan. The employer had to
bargain changes in good faith with the union.1
20
In other words, company executives had to wait until
both collective-bargaining agreements expired, then they
had to partially terminate the pension plan, all without
falling foul of the duty to bargain in good faith. This
promised to be difficult. In the normal course of industrial
relations, management would begin negotiating a new
collective-bargaining agreement months before the old one
expired. And 1958 was not normal. Laid-off workers at
Packard were anxious about the firm's plans for them and
eager to negotiate issues relating to the pension plan.
121
In April 1958, Cliff MacMillan, Studebaker-Packard's
Director of Industrial Relations, outlined a strategy for
meeting the legal and practical obstacles to a partial
termination. MacMillan intended to give notice to the UAW
that Studebaker-Packard would not renew its collective-
bargaining agreements with Local 190. The firm no longer
118. See Letter from S.B. Feuer to Royall Victor, Jr. (May 14, 1958) (Collection
of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local
190 notebook, Correspondence tab); Memorandum, Local 190 Collective
Bargaining Agreement Negotiations 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter CBA Negotiations]
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
1290, Local 190 notebook, Minutes tab).
119. See Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949).
120. More precisely, an employer could not take unilateral action until it
had bargained to impasse with the union. See generally J. Gilmer Bowman, Jr.,
An Employer's Unilateral Action-An Unfair Labor Practice? 9 VAND. L. REV.
487, 500-503 (1956).
121. Memorandum from W.P. Wray to C.M. MacMillan (Apr. 23, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
1290, Local 190 notebook, Correspondence tab).
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had active employees at Packard, MacMillan reasoned, so
there was "obviously no reason to continue the working
agreements" there.11 He recognized, however, that "[t~he
union will wish to negotiate with the Company for the
continuance of [pension and other benefit] programs." The
company's in-house lawyers had concluded that
Studebaker-Packard had no duty to bargain with Local 190
because there were no longer any active employees at
Packard. Management's position would be that "[we] will
only discuss the problems of ex-Packard Division employees
in our negotiations in South Bend.""
It is not hard to understand MacMillan's wish to
negotiate Packard issues in South Bend rather than
Detroit. The Packard shutdown created a zero-sum
relationship between the company's former employees at
Packard and its current employees at Studebaker. Money
spent to finance Packard retirement benefits came out of
revenues generated by production in South Bend. If this
money were kept in the firm, jobs in South Bend would be
more secure. Or the dollars spent on Packard benefits
might be paid as wages or benefits to employees at
Studebaker. This conflict of interest played an
indispensable role in the firm's plans.
Although company officials believed they had no
statutory duty to negotiate with Local 190, they worried
that an ambiguous provision in the pension plan might
force them to do so. Before Studebaker and Packard merged
in 1954, each had used a pension trust to finance its
retirement plan. After the two firms merged, the UAW
demanded that the company also merge the Studebaker
and Packard retirement plans. Management agreed and
combined the two pension plans in 1955.124 The agreement
with the UAW was ambiguous, however, about whether the
two pension trusts must be merged. In fact, company
122. Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan to H.E. Churchill, supra note 117.
123. Id.
124. See History of Pension Plan and Showing of Business Necessity for
Curtailment, attached as Exhibit A to Letter from S.B. Feuer to Director of
Internal Revenue, Pension Trust Division, Indianapolis, Ind., at 1-4 (July 7, 1958)
[hereinafter History of Pension Plan] (Collection of the Studebaker National
Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Studebaker-Packard Litigation Papers, Box 42,
Pension Plan-Amendment and Partial Termination folder); Supplemental
Agreement (Pension Plan) 3-4 (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum,
South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 3725, Exhibit A-Pension Plan Agreement folder).
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officials maintained separate trusts with different banks
serving as trustee. The firm's actuaries continued to
calculate separate pension liability for the Studebaker and
Packard divisions. And the Packard trust paid pensions
only to Packard retirees, while the Studebaker trust paid
pensions only to Studebaker retirees. '25
Managers were uncertain about how the contractual
provisions that governed termination of the pension plan
would apply to the two pension trusts. Like most retirement
plans, the Studebaker-Packard plan included a procedure
for distributing assets if the plan terminated. The
termination clause ranked employees in terms of the
relative priority of their claims against the assets of the
plan. Assets would be allocated first to pay benefits to
retirees; next, to active employees age sixty-five or older
(employees eligible to retire under the normal retirement
provision of the plan); then, to employees age sixty or older
who had not retired (employees eligible under the early
retirement provision of the plan); and so on.2 6
An executive described the problem in a memorandum
to the firm's outside attorneys at Cravath, Swaine & Moore.
If Studebaker-Packard terminated the pension plan with
respect to Packard employees, he wondered, would the plan
have to use money from the separate Studebaker trust to
pay pensions owed to former Packard employees? This was
an important question because the Packard trust did not
have nearly enough assets to pay the benefits promised to
Packard employees. At the end of 1957 the liability for
Packard retirement benefits was about $27 million while
the Packard trust had only $9.6 million in assets.12 If the
termination clause allowed Packard employees to "invade
the Studebaker Trust Fund," then a partial termination of
the plan would divert millions of dollars reserved for
Studebaker pensions. Management would have to negotiate
with Local 190 to prevent this. "[I]s there any way," the
executive inquired, "to prevent Packard employees from
125. History of Pension Plan, supra note 124, at 4.
126. See 1950 Pension Plan, supra note 36, at 49-51; see also Memorandum
from Bloch to Brindle, supra note 79, at 1.
127. Memorandum, Studebaker-Packard Corp., UAW-CIO Pension Plan
Actuarial Liabilities as of Dec. 31, 1957 (June 20, 1958) (Collection of the




being able to secure pensions from money paid by the
Corporation into the segregated Studebaker Trust Fund?"'
2 8
By early June, company officials and attorneys at
Cravath devised a way to protect the assets in the
Studebaker trust. The safest course was to undo the merger
of the Studebaker and Packard retirement plans. On
September 2, one day after Local 5's collective-bargaining
agreements expired, the firm would create separate
retirement plans for Studebaker and Packard employees,
each with its own pension trust. With separate plans and
trusts, Packard employees could look only to the Packard
trust to pay their pensions. The firm would "then terminate
the Plan as to [Packard] employees on September 3," a
Cravath attorney explained.'29
This strategy hinged on the conflict of interest between
Packard and Studebaker workers. The firm had a statutory
duty to bargain pension issues, so managers would need to
inform Local 5 of their plans. As the Cravath attorney
observed, "The announcement of your intentions to Local 5
prior to the expiration of your contract with that
organization would fortify your defense as to any charges
that the Corporation refused to bargain in good faith by
subsequent unilateral action" affecting the plan.13 Plainly,
company officials were relying on Local 5 to collaborate, at
least implicitly, in the partial termination. The attorney
noted, "There appears to be some ,gossibility that Local 5
would be amenable to the proposal.'
As managers and lawyers worked to resolve these legal
issues, the firm moved forward with the termination
strategy. At the end of April, Cliff MacMillan gave notice
that Studebaker-Packard would not renew its collective-
bargaining agreement with Local 190.3' In June the UAW
asked to negotiate issues relating to the Packard
128. CBA Negotiations, supra note 118, at 3.
129. Letter from T.G.S. Christensen to Melvin L. Milligan 2 (June 10, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer
1290, Local 190 notebook, Correspondence tab).
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id.
132. Letter from C.M. MacMillan to Ken Morris (Apr. 28, 1958) (Collection of




shutdown.3 ' MacMillan replied that management would not
"bargain" on these issues with Local 190 or with the
International Union, but management was willing to meet
"for the purpose of discussing them."" There followed a
series of meetings in which, according to company records,
union representatives claimed the firm was obliged to
negotiate and company officials replied that it was not, and
union representatives asked what management planned to
do about Packard's retirement plan and managers said they
had made no decisions.'35 But the union knew something
was up. "There is no doubt in my mind that the
International Union is as well targeted in on questions of
what can and cannot be done under the pensions.., as we
are," MacMillan reported."6 But with no plant and no
employees in Detroit, the union had no leverage. Local 190's
collective-bargaining agreements lapsed at the end of June.
On July 1, Studebaker-Packard and Local 5 began
negotiating a new collective-bargaining agreement for the
Studebaker plant in South Bend."' Bargaining proceeded
desultorily through July and into August because Local 5
was waiting for negotiations with the Big Three auto
manufacturers to establish the industry pattern.13
Management did not disclose the company's proposal for
133. Letter from Ken Morris to C.M. MacMillan (June 11, 1958) (Collection
of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local
190 notebook, Correspondence tab).
134. Letter from C.M. MacMillan to Ken Morris (June 17, 1958) (Collection of
the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local 190
folder).
135. See Minutes, Meeting with International Union-190 Agreement 1-2
(June 20, 1958) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend,
Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local 190 folder); Memorandum, Telephone Conversation
with Ken Morris (June 23, 1958) (Collection of the Studebaker National
Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local 190 folder) (between G.T.
Gallagher and Ken Morris); Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan to H.E.
Churchill (June 26, 1958) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum,
South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local 190 folder).
136. Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan to H.E. Churchill, supra note 135.
137. Letter from C.M. MacMillan to William L. Mariner (July 2, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1958
Negotiation Minutes and Proposals (No. 121), notebook No. 91.51.184,
Correspondence tab).
138. See Letter from C.M. MacMillan to H.E. Churchill (Aug. 13, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1958




separate pension plans until August 20th. Company
minutes report that Cliff MacMillan told representatives of
Local 5, "The two funds are to be kept separate to avoid the
possibility of Packard employees drawing from the
Studebaker find.""9 The next day, at a meeting in Detroit
attended by representatives of the UAW International
Union, Local 190, and Local 5, MacMillan described the
proposal in more detail. The company would create "two
separate plans," he said, "one of which would beimmediately terminated."' Studebaker-Packard was "in
effect,... reverting to the set-up as it originally existed
several years ago," MacMillan explained.' And he clearly
spelled out that this plan was a "proposal to Local 5. "1
MacMillan's announcement laid bare the conflict
between Local 190 and Local 5 and put the International
Union in a difficult position. The Packard trust had $9.5
million in assets. The pension liability to Packard workers
who had already retired was $13.7 million. The company's
proposal threatened to reduce their benefits by 30% and
leave nothing for other participants, including over 400
former employees age sixty or older with vested pension
rights. 4 1 Calling the company's plan "completely
unacceptable," the International Union presented a
counterproposal several days later. The International
Union agreed with the proposal to create separate plans for
Studebaker and Packard employees but insisted that the
firm transfer enough assets to pay full pensions to Packard
retirees and to former employees who had applied for a
pension. T14
The International Union's proposal would require
Studebaker-Packard to shift about $3.5 million (of $14
million) from the Studebaker pension trust to the Packard
139. Minutes, Meeting No. 25: Contract Negotiations (Aug. 20, 1958),
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1958
Negotiation Minutes and Proposals (No. 121), notebook No. 91.51.184, Minutes
tab).
140. Minutes, Company-Union Meeting-Detroit Phase-Out Problems,
Local 190, at 1 (Aug. 21, 1958) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum,
South Bend, Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local 190 folder).
141. Id. at 3.
142. Id.
143. See Telegram from Ray Berndt and Ken Morris to C.M. McMillan 1
(Aug. 26, 1958) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend,
Indiana, Drawer 1290, Local 190 notebook, Correspondence tab).
144. See id. at 2.
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trust.145 This pushed Local 5 openly into alliance with
management. The coalition was cemented on August 27
when company officials presented the International Union's
proposal to the Local 5 bargaining committee. Company
minutes state that Local 5 representatives were "deeply
concerned about the disbursement of the money funded for
Studebaker employees under the Studebaker Pension
Plan." 146 At the same meeting, the company and Local 5
finalized a contract extension under which Local 5's
collective-bargaining agreement would lapse for several
days to permit the company to terminate the Packard
pension plan. 4 1 On August 28, Local 5 approved the
extension agreement without a dissenting vote."
To split the pension plan and terminate the Packard
plan, management needed the approval of Studebaker-
Packard's board of directors. On August 26 the board
passed a resolution, effective September 2, that created two
plans. Plan A would cover Studebaker workers; Plan B
would cover former Packard employees. The board then
passed a second resolution that would terminate Plan B on
September 3.149 The timing of the board's action counted on
the conflict of interest between Local 190 and Local 5. By
acting before Local 5's collective-bargaining agreement
expired, the board arguably violated the statutory duty to
bargain in good faith. When a Cravath attorney pointed out
145. Memorandum, UAW-CIO's Claims on Behalf of Packard Pensioners 4
(Oct. 1, 1958) [hereinafter UAW-CIO's Claims] (Collection of the Studebaker
National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Studebaker-Packard Litigation
Papers, Box 42, Pension Plan-Amendment and Partial Termination folder).
146. Minutes, Meeting No. 28: Contract Negotiations (Aug. 27, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1958
Negotiation Minutes and Proposals (No. 121), notebook No. 91.51.184, Minutes
tab).
147. Id.; see also Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan to P.A. Braner (Aug.
29, 1958) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
1958 Negotiation Minutes and Proposals (No. 121), notebook No. 91.51.184,
Minutes tab).
148. Edward Wrobel, Recording Secretary, Minutes, Membership Meeting
(Aug. 28, 1958) (UAW Local 5 Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs,
Wayne State University, Box 10, Minutes of Executive Board and Membership
Meetings-1958 folder).
149. Amendment to UAW-CIO Pension Plan 2 (Aug. 27, 1958), (Collection of




the problem, a company official dismissed it. 5' "It is our
feeling," the official wrote, "that there is no reasonable
likelihood that Local 5 would seize upon such contingency
to seriously pursue such argument."
51
By September 4, when representatives of management
and Local 5 executed the contract extension, the company
had terminated the Packard pension plan. The
International Union continued to argue that the
termination was invalid while, according to an internal
company memorandum, Local 5 "urged the Company to
resist 'dilution' of the pension funds available for
Studebaker employees in the manner requested by the
International Union."'52 Managers and the International
Union debated the legality of the termination for several
months. In November the International Union filed suit in
federal court seeking to annul the company's actions. 5 '
The Packard experience led representatives of Local 5
to focus less on the level of benefits and more on the level of
funding in the Studebaker pension plan. According to
company minutes, they "wanted proof-positive that that
money is there, and will be there regardless of the outcome
of the Detroit problem."5 4  In November Willard
Solenberger, a pension specialist from the UAW
International Union, told managers "that the Union is not
so much concerned about the level of benefits, but they are
concerned about the security of the present benefits for the
150. See Letter from William J. Nolan, Jr. to S.B. Feuer 1 (July 23, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
Studebaker-Packard Litigation Papers, Box 42, Pension Plan-Amendment and
Partial Termination folder) (discussing hourly-rated employees' pension plan).
151. Letter from S.B. Feuer to G.S. Christensen (Aug. 1, 1958) (Collection of
the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Studebaker-Packard
Litigation Papers, Box 42, Pension Plan-Amendment and Partial Termination
folder).
152. UAW-CIO's Claims, supra note 145, at 4.
153. Complaint, Intl Union, United Auto. Workers of Am. v. Studebaker-
Packard Corp. (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 1958) (No. 18577) (Collection of the
Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Studebaker-Packard
Litigation Papers, Box 41, The International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America folder).
154. Minutes, Meeting No. 63: Contract Negotiations (Oct. 22, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1958




present retirees and prospective retirees."155 The company
and Local 5 eventually agreed to maintain the terms of the
plan unchanged until September 1, 1959.16
Packard retirees continued to receive their full pension
until January 1959, when Studebaker-Packard and the
International Union agreed that benefits should be reduced
pending the outcome of the litigation.57  Actuarial
adjustments and investment performance improved the
financial position of the Packard trust, but the assets still
were not sufficient to pay the full pensions owed to retirees.
In October 1959, Studebaker-Packard and the UAW
reached a settlement that reduced benefits for retirees to
85% of the level prior to the termination. Employees who
were eligible to retire when the plan terminated but who
did not submit pension applications until after September
2, 1958 received a lump-sum payment of about $43 per year
of service. Others got nothing.5 '
V. "PUBLIC REINSURANCE FOR PRIVATE PENSION PLANS"
Some press reports put a positive spin on the UAW's
settlement of the lawsuit. "Packard Pensions Assured," read
a headline in the Detroit News.'59 But for union leaders the
termination powerfully manifested the default risk union
members faced. The Packard experience, like the earlier
shutdowns at Kaiser-Frazer and Hudson, stirred the UAW
155. Minutes, Meeting No. 67: Contract Negotiations (Nov. 7, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1958
Negotiation Minutes and Proposals (No. 121), notebook No. 91.51.184, Minutes
tab).
156. Minutes, Meeting No. 79: Contract Negotiations (Nov. 27, 1958)
(Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1958
Negotiation Minutes and Proposals (No. 121), notebook No. 91.51.184, Minutes
tab); Collective Bargaining Agreement Memorandum of Understanding (Nov.
27, 1958) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
1958 Negotiation Minutes and Proposals (No. 121), notebook No. 91.51.184,
Minutes tab).
157. Studebaker, UAW Slate Pension Cut for Packard Workers Pending
Shift, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1959.
158. See Memorandum, UAW v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., Negotiations for
Settlement (Oct. 28, 1959) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum,
South Bend, Indiana, Studebaker-Packard Litigation Papers, Box 41, The
International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America folder).




to take steps to make employees' expectations more secure.
Union officials developed new demands for bargaining with
individual employers, but they also concluded that default
risk called for a collective solution that would require
legislation. UAW pension specialists came up with the idea
of an insurance fund akin to the FDIC. By guaranteeing the
obligations of retirement plans, the fund would shift default
risk away from employees in weak firms. The proposal
posed a number of practical problems, however, because
pension obligations differ materially from the risks covered
by private insurers.
Shortly after the UAW settled its litigation against
Studebaker-Packard, union president Walter Reuther
asked Nat Weinberg, who directed the Special Projects
Department, to begin thinking about ways to protect
employees "with respect to pensions... if they have the
Hudson-Packard experience where the plant goes out of
existence.""' In fact, shutdowns at smaller firms had led the
UAW Social Security Department to take a hard look at
default risk even before the Packard termination. In June
1958 UAW actuary Max Bloch described the union's
experience:
One of the first slogans used in our pension drives was that UAW
negotiated plans are 'fully ftmded'. Without trying to define this
nebulous concept, we soon woke up to the sad fact that 'fully
funded pension plans' are among the rarest animals, and we have
been waiting ever since to see one.... When a pension plan is
terminated, its funds are never better than inadequate, and in too
many cases hopelessly inadequate.
1 61
Bloch devoted much of his discussion to an intractable
and revealing problem-how to make vested rights
meaningful when a pension plan terminated. His proposed
solution is less important than the problem itself, for the
problem illustrates another trade-off entailed by the UAW's
commitment to protecting older workers and retirees.
"Vested rights," Bloch said, "were hailed as a great
160. Nat Weinberg, WPR Note (n.d.) (UAW Research Department
Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession No. 646, dated June 3, 1974, Box
107, Pension Investments folder, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne
State University).
161. Memorandum from Bloch to Brindle, supra note 79, at 1.
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achievement when they were won."'62  But the "sad
experience" of employees with vested rights was that "in the
event of plan termination, the so-called vested right clauses
are not worth the paper they are written on." " "To this
date," he observed, "they have not been translated into cash
for the workers, and that is why they have not been much
talked about lately.... They must be made to stick, even in
the event of a plan termination.""
One reason "vested rights" did not "stick" in 1958 was
the procedure for allocating assets when a pension plan
terminated. Most UAW plans included a termination clause
like the one in the Studebaker-Packard plan.'65 The clause
sorted employees into classes then ranked the classes in
terms of the priority of their claim to plan assets. Retirees
came first, then active employees who qualified for normal
retirement, and so on. Under this provision, all benefit
obligations to a class with higher priority had to be paid
before any assets were allocated to the next lower class in
line.'66 There was an incongruity between this asset-
distribution scheme and the contribution formula in UAW
plans. The contribution formula required an employer to
pay the cost attributed to current accruals plus an amount
that would amortize past-service liability. This made it
appear that the employer was fully funding benefits earned
in the current year and gradually paying off past-service
credits.'67 In fact, something very different was-going on.
The contribution formula only determined how much an
employer paid in to a pension plan. The termination clause
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. (emphasis in original).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 2.
166. Richard Ippolito hypothesizes that underfumded pension plans respond
to the threat that unionized workers will extract quasi-rents from a firm that
invests in durable, specialized assets. See Richard A. Ippolito, The Economic
Function of Underfunded Pension Plans, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 611, 615-616
(1985). It is a premise of Ippolito's model that the default of an underfunded
pension plan imposes losses on employees in proportion to the present value of
the annuity an employee expects to receive. Id. at 622. The model also assumes
that the default of an underfunded pension plan imposes proportional losses on
active employees and retirees. In Ippolito's words, "in erecting a bonding device
to discourage holdups, care must be taken to ensure that [the bond] reaches
retirees at the time of firm failure." Id. at 621-22. The termination provision in
UAW retirement plans-which gave the greatest protection to retirees and
retirement-eligible employees--does not accord with these premises.
167. SASS, supra note 11, at 185.
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determined who got something when a plan shut down. And
as UAW actuary Howard Young later observed, the
termination clause had the effect "of allocating all
contributions to older employees first."168
As the Packard termination illustrates, in the recently
established plans of the 1950s the liability for pensions
owed to the highest ranked class of plan participants-
retirees-could consume all of the assets. In such a case,
the termination clause made vesting meaningless. Active
employees whose labor was the source of an employer's
pension contributions were likely to receive little or nothing
if their plan terminated. This result, Bloch argued, did not
jibe with employees' sense of fairness. "All workers covered
by a pension plan feel that they are contributing towards its
costs by giving up wage increases," he wrote. 'When a fund
is liquidated, they feel that all should participate."
69
The most direct means for tackling this problem was
collective bargaining. The UAW had negotiated vesting
provisions after the Kaiser-Frazer and Hudson shutdowns
drew attention to the problem of forfeiture risk. After the
Packard termination, union officials took similar steps to
address "areas of weakness" in UAW retirement plans. In
November 1958, a union official warned union negotiators
about the dangers of demanding benefit increases in poorly
funded plans. "In some situations," he said, "it may be
necessary to subordinate pension improvements to the
safety of the benefits." The memorandum also included
proposed contractual provisions that would prevent an
employer from amending a pension plan after a collective-
bargaining agreement had expired and limit an employer's
discretion when a pension plan was split as a result of a"plant closing," "partial transfer of ownership," or a
"termination.
' 3
168. Letter from Howard Young to James Brindle (Sept. 15, 1961) (Howard
Young Collection, Box 1, 1961 chronological file, Archives of Labor and Urban
Affairs, Wayne State University).
169. Memorandum from Bloch to Brindle, supra note 79, at 2 (emphasis in
original). For discussion of the apparent unfairness of this termination
arrangement, see SASS, supra note 11, at 184, and LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra
note 2, at 73.
170. Memorandum from James Brindle to Regional Directors and
Department Heads 4 (Nov. 6, 1958) (UAW Research Department Collection,
Unprocessed Materials, Accession No. 646, dated June 3, 1974, Archives of
Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box 62, UAW-Pensions
1960-70 (2 of 2) folder).
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These contractual provisions would provide some
additional security to union members, but they would not
eliminate default risk. In the context of collective
bargaining with an individual employer, the only way the
UAW could eliminate default risk was to negotiate for full
funding. To achieve higher levels of funding, the union
would have to forgo benefit improvements, demand larger
contributions from employers, or both.1"' These options had
significant costs. If the union postponed benefit increases,
retirement plans would be a less effective means of
personnel administration. Inflation would erode the
purchasing power of pension benefits, and employees would
wait longer to retire. If the union demanded larger
contributions, weak firms like Studebaker might not be able
to pay. If an employer could afford more rapid funding,
higher contributions would come at the expense of lower
wages for active employees. In sum, if the union relied on
collective bargaining alone, it could not eliminate the risk of
default in the future without providing less to retirees or
active employees in the present.
Dissatisfied with these choices, the UAW formulated a
proposal that would alter the institutional framework of
collective bargaining to accommodate the union's funding
practices.' In March 1961, Nat Weinberg informed Walter
Reuther that union pension experts were considering "the
idea of establishing something like the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation to backstop private pension plans."' 3
The appeal of a government guaranty was that it would
reconfigure the "incentive structure" in which employers
and unions bargained for retirement plans. 4 Insurance
171. For a discussion that follows the logic of this paragraph see Letter from
Willard E. Solenberger to Leonard Lesser (Feb. 28, 1964) (UAW Research
Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession No. 646, dated June
3, 1974, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box 106,
Pension Reinsurance Correspondence-Prior to 1970 folder).
172. See generally Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-
Invisible Hand, 17 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1974) (arguing that people do not only
pursue their self interests within the rules, but they also allocate resources
towards changing the rules to their own benefit).
173. Letter from Nat Weinberg to Walter P. Reuther (Mar. 22, 1961)
[hereinafter Weinberg letter of Mar. 22, 1961] (UAW President's Office: Walter
Reuther Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State
University, Box 164, Folder 13).
174. For "incentive structure," see Douglass North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 97 (1991); see also SASS, supra note 11, at 210.
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against default risk would make it unnecessary to eliminate
underflnding. But insuring pension obligations was not a
simple matter. As Weinberg told Reuther, union pension
experts had "come up with a number of technical problems
that would have to be resolved to implement this idea."'75
The "technical problems" resulted from the fact that
default risk differs markedly from the risks private insurers
usually underwrite.'76  Ideally, an insurance program
involves entities that face relatively homogeneous levels of
a random or fortuitous risk that results in clearly definable
losses. The entities transfer their individual risks to an
insurer that combines the individual risks into a large pool.
Pooling of risks allows the insurer to accurately predict the
losses for the group as a whole. The ease or difficulty of
insuring a risk depends on how closely the risk corresponds
to these ideal conditions. The more a risk diverges from the
ideal, the harder it is to insure. At some point, the risk
ceases to be insurable. 7 That is, an insurer cannot create a
stable pool of voluntary premium-paying policyholders.
Risks that deviate from the ideal are harder to insure
because they expose the insurer to "moral hazard" and
"adverse selection." As Carol Heimer observes, insurers face
moral hazard because "it is not possible to transfer risk
from a policyholder to an insurer without altering the
incentives of the policyholder."'78 In other words, moral
hazard refers to the possibility that the existence of
insurance coverage will cause changes in conduct that
increase the losses that must be paid by the insurer.
Adverse selection refers to the fact that insurance buyers
are likely "to be a nonrandom selection from the
population-more particularly, to be those who expect to
175. Weinberg letter of Mar. 22, 1961, supra note 173.
176. My discussion of the problems with a pension guaranty fund generally
follows Dan M. McGill, Guaranty Fund for Private Pension Obligations, in
SUBCOMIM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE J. ECONOMIC COMI., 90th CONG., REPORT ON
OLD AGE INCOME ASSURANCE PART V: FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF PENSION PLANS 199-
247 (Comm. Print 1967) [hereinafter McGill, Guaranty Fund]. For discussion of
the persistent problems with ERISA's termination insurance program, see
IPPOLITO, supra note 96, and Steven Sass, Risk at the PBGC: The Public
Guarantee of Private Pension Benefits, REGIONAL REV., Spring 1996, at 19-24.
177. See JAMES L. ATHEARN, RISK AND INSURANCE 35-41 (2d ed. 1969); see
also McGill, Guaranty Fund, supra note 176, at 206-10.
178. CAROL A. HEnIER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING
MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 1 (1985).
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have the highest expected claims."179 If an insurer cannot or
does not charge premiums that accurately reflect the risks
posed by the entities in the insurance pool, then adverse
selection may destabilize the pool because high-risk entities
will stay in while low-risk entities will opt out.
Default risk deviates from the ideal conditions of
insurability in a number of respects that make it difficult to
design a viable pension-guaranty program. Union officials
wrestled with these complexities as they fleshed out the
proposal. One problem was delineating the losses the
program would cover. As noted above, an insurance
program will be more stable if the insurer can clearly define
the event that triggers liability.8 ' At first glance, it seemed
obvious what event should trigger the pension guaranty.
When a firm went out of business, the program would
protect employees if the pension plan was not fully funded.
But as the Packard case illustrates, a firm did not have to
go out of business to terminate a pension plan. UAW
pension specialist Willard Solenberger alluded to a variety
of possibilities in his notes-for example, cases where a firm
partially terminated a plan as a result of a plant closing or
where there had been a "Reduction in force making Plan
costs 'prohibitive."'18' Yet broad insurance coverage might
create its own problems. Union actuary Howard Young
noted the possibility of what later became known as the
"follow-on" plan."' "[I]f a plan with a large past service
liability could be abandoned with a major portion of the
liability thrown on the Reinsurance Fund," he observed,
"the employer could then adopt a new plan covering only
future service at much lower cost."8 3 Concerns of this sort
179. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT 595 (1992).
180. See McGill, Guaranty Fund, supra note 176, at 207, 218.
181. Willard, E. Solenberger, Notes on Pension Reinsurance Scheme 1 (Mar.
22, 1962) [hereinafter Notes on Pension Reinsurance Scheme] (UAW Research
Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession No. 646, dated June
3, 1974, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box 106,
Pension Reinsurance Correspondence-Prior to 1970 folder).
182. See IPPOLITO, supra note 96, at 69-73.
183. Letter from Howard Young to Leonard Lesser 1 (Apr. 16, 1962)
[hereinafter Letter from Young to Lesser, Apr. 16, 1962] (Howard Young
Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box
1, 1962 chronological file).
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led Young to "question the feasibility of trying to cover
every type of termination."
18 4
Even if legislators could clearly define the events the
program would cover, it would be very difficult to estimate
the risk presented by particular plans. For an individual
plan the expected loss depended on two factors: (1) the
,liability or exposure if the sponsor terminated the plan, and
(2) the likelihood that the sponsor would terminate the
plan.' The insurance program would pay the difference
between the cost of some or all of the benefits the plan
promised and the value of the plan assets available to pay
those benefits. Computing the first factor would be difficult
because plans used different benefit formulas and different
actuarial-cost methods. 86 It would be even harder to
estimate the risk that a firm would terminate its plan.
"How assess variable risk presented by individual
companies?" Solenberger wondered in his notes.'87 Yet these
calculations would provide the basis for computing
premiums under the program. Solenberger suggested that
it might require a "guess with crystal ball" to determine the
charge for the first year.'88
Even if administrators could accurately assess expected
losses, the insurance program could not charge premiums
that reflected the risks posed by particular retirement
plans. Many plans would present little or no risk of loss.
For example, a plan that was fully funded was not likely to
default.89 Likewise, an underfunded plan sponsored by a
large, stable firm-GM, for example-entailed little risk
because the firm was unlikely to terminate the plan.9 ' In
184. Id.
185. See IPPOLITO, supra note 96, at 88-89.
186. See Notes on Pension Reinsurance Scheme, supra note 181, at 3.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Enclosure, Public Reinsurance for Private Pension Plans 6,
attached to Letter from Howard Young to Leonard Lesser 1 (Apr. 16, 1962)
[hereinafter Public Reinsurance for Private Pension Plans] (Howard Young
Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box
1, 1962 chronological file).
190. See Letter from Howard Young to Leonard Lesser (July 9, 1964)
(Howard Young Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State
University, Box 1, 1964 chronological file); cf. Letter from Howard Young to Nat
Weinberg 2 (July 15, 1963) [hereinafter Letter from Young to Weinberg, July
15, 1963) (Howard Young Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs,
Wayne State University, Box 1, 1963 chronological file).
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contrast, a struggling firm with an underfunded plan posed
a much greater risk because there was a much greater
likelihood that the plan would terminate and default. Yet a
weak firm might not be able to pay a premium that
accurately reflected its risk to the insurance program. This
meant that if the program was to protect all employees who
participated in a defined-benefit plan, there would need to
be subsidies for weak employers. "Some of the insurance
burden shifted to stronger companies," Solenberger
recorded in his notes.'91 If premiums did not accurately
reflect expected losses, however, the insurance program
would be exposed to adverse selection because low-risk
firms would have an incentive to opt out.
Finally, the loss covered by termination insurance was
not random.9 ' An employer had substantial control over
whether and when its pension plan terminated. In addition,
an employer and often a union possessed control over
benefit levels, actuarial assumptions, funding patterns,
investments, and other factors that would determine the
insurance program's exposure. To the extent that an
employer or union could affect the occurrence or amount of
a default, the program faced moral hazard.9 3 One danger
was that firms would cut back on funding because the
insurance program would pay benefits if a plan defaulted.
As Solenberger put it, 'What safeguard against inadequate
funding plus insurance as alternative to adequate funding?
Both company and union might connive on this as being
cheaper . . . . "' Staffers debated whether "a reasonable
amortization program (30 to 40 years) should be required"
to prevent this possibility.'95 Solenberger also made note of
other possible examples of moral hazard. "Employer with
business failure looming on horizon, sets up plan and takes
chance (perhaps under union pressure)," he conjectured.'
Early in 1962, union officials circulated an outline of a
program of "public reinsurance for private pension plans."
The draft sketched out a framework for a guaranty fund
and attempted to address some of the problems the
191. Notes on Pension Reinsurance Scheme, supra note 181, at 6; see also
Letter from Young to Weinberg, July 15, 1963, supra note 190.
192. See McGill, Guaranty Fund, supra note 176, at 208.
193. SASS, supra note 11, at 209-10.
194. Notes on Pension Reinsurance Scheme, supra note 181, at 4.
195. Letter from Young to Lesser, Apr. 16, 1962, supra note 183, at 3.
196. Notes on Pension Reinsurance Scheme, supra note 181, at 2.
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program would face.19 ' The proposal would insure pension
benefits in case the sponsoring employer terminated a plan
and the plan defaulted. Employers would be required to pay"premiums" that would have two components. Part of the
charge would be based on the exposure that resulted from a
plan's level of finding. The higher the level of funding in a
plan-that is, the larger the ratio of the plan's assets to its
liability-the lower this component of the premium would
be. Thus, pay-as-you-go plans "would be subject to the
highest premiums," while fully-funded plans "would
probably not be subject to any premium for insurance
against this type of risk at all."'98 The second part of the
premium would be based on the risk that a plan's assets
might depreciate in value. The charge for this risk "would
be based on a computation involving the total assets
insured and the estimated risk of depreciation." Because
this risk was "very slight," the charge attributable to it was
likely to be "minimal."
The proposal included a number of features addressed
to adverse selection and moral hazard. The premium
formula took account of a plan's unfunded liability, but it
did not consider the likelihood that a plan would terminate.
Consequently, a strong firm and a weak firm that
sponsored identical underfunded plans would pay the same
premium even though the weak firm's plan was much more
likely to default. This gave strong firms an incentive to stay
out of the insurance program. To ensure that they
participated, the proposal made participation a requirement
for favorable tax treatment.2" Other features of the
proposal took aim at moral hazard. The draft recommended
limits on the amount of retirement benefits the program
would insure because "it is necessary to protect the
reinsurance system against a run on its funds which would
be precipitated by those one or two plans which provide
relatively exorbitant pensions to their members." 01 The
proposal also included a "suicide clause" that would require
plans to "have been in operation a specified, reasonable
197. See Public Reinsurance for Private Pension Plans, supra note 189;
Letter from Young to Lesser, Apr. 16, 1962, supra note 183, at 3.
198. Public Reinsurance for Private Pension Plans, supra note 189, at 5.
Pay-as-you-go plans were later dropped from the proposal.
199. Id. at 6.
200. Id. at 1.
201. Id. at 4 n.:.
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number of years before the insurance will be applicable."" 2
This provision aimed to prevent a firm from creating a
pension plan or increasing benefits shortly before it went
out of business or terminated the plan.
The designers of the termination-insurance proposal
continued their work through 1962 and 1963, but many
difficult and politically sensitive issues remained to be
resolved. Indeed, one of the most intractable questions was
the problem that, in a sense, had set them to their task:
How should the insurance program handle the case of a
declining firm that could no longer afford to pay for its
pension plan?
203
VI. "THE MOST GLORIOUS STORY OF FAILURE IN THE
BUSINESS": STUDEBAKER AS FOCUSING EVENT
While union officials worked on the termination-
insurance proposal, Studebaker continued its downward
slide. In December 1963, Studebaker-Packard announced
that it would close the plant in South Bend. When the plant
shut down, the liability of the Studebaker pension plan
exceeded its assets by $15 million. The shortfall made it
obvious that the plan would default. The UAW could do
little to change the lot of Studebaker employees, but the
shutdown provided an opportunity to get policy-makers to
seriously consider the pension-guaranty proposal. In the
early 1960s government officials and private-sector pension
experts were discussing a variety of regulatory initiatives to
make pension promises more secure. The shutdown was an
ideal vehicle for injecting termination insurance into these
policy debates. Working with Indiana Senator Vance
Hartke and his staff, union officials prepared legislation to
create such a program. When Hartke introduced the bill in
August 1964, Studebaker became a "poster child" for the
cause of pension reform and, more important from the
UAW's perspective, termination insurance moved squarely
onto the policy agenda.
202. Id. at 7-8. For "suicide clause," see Notes on Pension Reinsurance
Scheme, supra note 181, at 3.
203. See Memorandum, Nat Weinberg to Leonard Lesser, and Attachment,
Possible Method for Applying Pension Re-Insurance to Declining Firm (Feb. 7,
1964) (UAW Research Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession
No. 646, dated June 3, 1974, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State
University, Box 106, Pension Reinsurance Correspondence--Prior to 1970 folder).
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Studebaker-Packard had avoided bankruptcy in 1958
by restructuring its debt. This move passed "real control" of
the firm into "the hands of New York bankers.""4 They
began to diversify by purchasing profitable businesses so
that the firm could derive tax benefits from the losses of the
automotive division. 5 The diversification strategy was
briefly interrupted in 1959 when the firm underwent what
appeared to be a remarkable reversal of fortune. In the fall
of 1958 Studebaker introduced a new model-the Lark. One
of only two domestic compact cars, it was a stunning
success. "During the 1959 model year," a journalist
reported, "more than 138,000 Larks moved into dealer
showrooms, against a mere 56,000 S-P cars a year
earlier.""6 The firm more than doubled its market share,
and, for the first time since the Packard merger, both the
corporation and the automotive division made a profit.0 7
In 1958 management and Local 5 had postponed
bargaining about the retirement plan because of the
controversy surrounding the Packard termination. When
they took up pension issues in 1959, the firm was in the
midst of its revival. The seemingly rosy circumstances of
1959 made it difficult for management to deny Local 5
benefit increases the UAW had won at other firms.08
Management and Local 5 agreed to increase benefit levels
to the industry pattern. The new agreement gave retirees
$2.35 per month per year of service (up from $2.25). Active
employees would receive $2.40 per month for years before
January 1, 1959 and $2.50 per month for service after
January 1, 1959 (both up from $2.25).209 In return, the
company got a new thirty-year funding period. The
collective-bargaining agreement negotiated in 1955
required the company to pay off past-service liability by
204. Hammer, supra note 115, at 158.
205. See CRITCHLow, supra note 40, at 169-74.
206. Hammer, supra note 115, at 160.
207. See Memorandum on Studebaker Corporation, supra note 112, at 2-3,
tbl.II; see also CRITCOLOW, supra note 40, at 168 (noting that "[slales of the Lark
in the last quarter of 1958 put Studebaker in the black for the first time since
1953").
208. See Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan to H.E. Churchill (Apr. 16,
1959) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
Negotiations 1959 notebook, Correspondence tab).
209. See Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan to H.E. Churchill (Sept. 2,
1959) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
Negotiations 1959 notebook, Correspondence tab).
2001] 727
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
1985.210 The new agreement extended the fimding schedule
for all past-service liability to 1989.211 The new schedule
reduced Studebaker-Packard's pension contributions by
about $82,000 a year, but it also meant less money and less
security for employees if the plan terminated.212
Studebaker's comeback came to an abrupt end in 1960.
GM, Ford, and Chrysler introduced their own compacts in
the fall of 1959 (when the 1960 model year began). "By the
end of 1960, 11 domestically produced 'compact' cars
competed for sales."213  In such an environment,
Studebaker's poor dealer organization doomed it, and
production again went into a slide. In 1959 the company
produced 154,000 cars at the South Bend plant. In 1960
production fell to 106,000 units and then to 79,000 in
1961.214 The automotive division lost money,21  and a
"Collective Bargaining Report" prepared in 1960 observed
that "profits are problematical for the Automobile Division"
again.2
16
Not only was Studebaker weak. The pension plan was
as well. As the UAW geared up for negotiations in 1961
UAW actuary Howard Young warned Willard Solenberger
about the plan's "inadequate depth of funding." The book
value of the assets held by the Studebaker pension trust
was about $19.2 million. The plan's liability to retirees was
$13.1 million, and its liability to active employees who were
eligible to retire was $8.9 million. "[I]f the plan had
210. See 1966 JEC Hearings, supra note 85, at 104 (statement of Clifford M.
MacMillan).
211. See id.
212. In 1958 the cost of the Studebaker's bargained pension plans, of which
Local 5 was far and away the largest, was $2,573,000. If the increased benefits
in the 1959 Agreement were funded by 1985, the annual cost would have
increased to $2,825,000. Under the extended amortization schedule, the annual
cost would be $2,743,000. See Annual Pension Plan Costs, attached to Letter
from Edwin M. Bush, Jr. to R.C. Rieffel (June 18, 1959) (Collection of the
Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, Negotiations 1959
notebook, Pensions tab).
213. Memorandum on Studebaker Corporation, supra note 112, at 3; see also
CR1TcHLOW, supra note 40, at 172.
214. Memo on Studebaker Corporation, supra note 112, at 3.
215. Id. at 3-4; Letter from Emily Rosdolsky to Raymond H. Berndt (Oct. 24,
1963) (UAW President's Office: Walter Reuther Collection, Archives of Labor and
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box 168, folder 7).
216. Memorandum from C.M. MacMillan 1 (Sept. 28, 1961) (Collection of




terminated as of 12/31/60," Young observed, "we could have
purchased only 87.3% of full benefits for those retired,
assuming everyone eligible had retired."217
Solenberger took this warning to heart. Local 5 initially
demanded that pensions be increased to the industry
pattern of $2.80 per month per year of service.218 When
Solenberger traveled to South Bend, he did not make such a
proposal. According to company minutes Solenberger
"declared that looking at costs, [the union] had no intention
of proposing that [the company] meet pattern at the benefit
level."' Under the previous contract, benefits for active
employees were $2.40 per month per year of service for
years prior to September 1, 1959 and $2.50 thereafter.
Solenberger asked only that Studebaker level off active
workers' benefits at $2.50 for all years. Studebaker agreed
to this smaller benefit increase. Benefits for workers who
had retired before September 1959 remained at $2.35 per
month per year of service.220
Over the next two years the automotive division
continued to struggle and the board of directors continued
to diversify. In 1962 and the first ten months of 1963, the
board added five new acquisitions to the five companies
Studebaker-Packard had acquired by the end of 1961.221
Diversification made the corporation much less dependent
on automobile production.22 The acquisitions allowed the
firm to show a profit in 1962 despite losses in the
automotive division, but diversification foreclosed
modernization of the plant in South Bend. In the first half
of 1963, "the best automotive model year in history," the
automotive division's losses "exceeded the profits made on
217. See Letter from Howard Young to William Solenberger (Oct. 24, 1961)
(Howard Young Collection, Archives of Labor and Union Affairs, Box 1, 1961
chronological file).
218. Memorandum, 1961 Contract Negotiations (Oct. 31, 1961) (Collection of
the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1961-1962 Negotiation
Index (No. 43), notebook No. 91.51.165, Special Topics tab).
219. Memorandum, 1961 Contract Negotiations (Nov. 30, 1961) (Collection
of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1961-1962
Negotiation Index (No. 43), notebook No. 91.51.165, Special Topics tab).
220. Memorandum, 1961 Contract Negotiations (Dec. 13, 1961) (Collection
of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1961-1962
Negotiation Index (No. 43), notebook No. 91.51.165, Special Topics tab); 1966
JEC Hearings (statement of Clifford M. MacMillan), supra note 85, at 104.
221. See Memorandum on Studebaker Corporation, supra note 112, at 4.
222. Id., at app.3.
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all other operations by $7.5 million."223 Writing in October
1963 a UAW analyst concluded, "The company's inability to
break even in the best automotive model year in history
raises serious questions concerning its future as an
automotive producer."2 4  On December 9, Studebaker-
Packard announced it would close the South Bend plant.22 '
Although Studebaker had been on the rocks for years-
one wag called it "the best managed bankruptcy in the
world 22 -- the shutdown came as a shock to many
employees. 227 As wrenching as the plant closing may have
been, the fate of the pension plan was a foregone
conclusion. It was clear that the plan would default. Two
weeks after the company's announcement, UAW Research
Director Nat Weinberg told Walter Reuther, "I am advised
that the average age of the South Bend Studebaker workers
is 54 and that it is unlikely that the pension fund will have
sufficient monies to pay pensions to workers under 60 years
of age." 28 A month later a revised calculation revealed that
retirees and retirement-eligible employees would receive
100% of their pension. But the pension trust was still "at
least $15,000,000 short of being able to fulfill pension
promises for the 4,392 present and former employees with
vested rights."2 9
Shortly after the first of the year, Local 5 called upon
Studebaker-Packard to set aside enough money to fund the
retirement benefits owed to retirees and vested employees.
"The pension plan," union leaders claimed, "represents a
private promise by the Studebaker Corporation which
socially, morally and as a matter of equity they are
223. Id. at 4, 6; see also WHITE, supra note 44, at 301.
224. Id. at 6.
225. See Frederick Taylor, Studebaker Corp. Will Stop Making Autos in
U.S.; Plans to Import Cars from Canadian Assembly Plant, WALL ST. J., Dec.
10, 1963, at 3.
226. Automobiles: Studebaker's Problems, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1963, at 93.
227. See CRITCHLOW, supra note 40, at 181; Workers and Dealers Are
Stunned by Studebaker Plan, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1963, at 3.
228. Letter from Nat Weinberg to Walter P. Reuther (Dec. 28, 1963)
[hereinafter Letter from Weinberg to Reuther Dec. 28, 1963] (UAW Research
Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession No. 646, dated June
3, 1974, Archives of Labor and Urban Wffairs, Wayne State University, Box 64,
Studebaker, 1963-64 folder).
229. Letter from Willard E. Solenberger to Emil Mazey (Jan. 29, 1964)
(UAW President's Office: Walter Reuther Collection, Archives of Labor and
Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box 168, Folder 8).
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obligated to keep"' When the company declined, there was
little to be done."' In January 1964 Walter Reuther asked
the union's attorney to see if it was possible to complicate
Studebaker's taxes "as a leverage to get favorable
consideration of [an] additional company contribution to the
pension and severance pay fund."23" Later the UAW filed a
grievance contending that the shutdown violated the
collective-bargaining agreement with Local 5.233 In light of
the huge shortfall in the pension fund, these actions, even if
successful, would not change the fate of Studebaker
employees.
In the spring and summer of 1964, Studebaker-Packard
requested bids from life insurance companies to provide
annuities to retirees. 34 On October 15, 1964, after several
months of negotiations, the company and Local 5 executed
an agreement that terminated the plan along the lines set
out in the 1961 collective-bargaining agreement. The first
three classes of beneficiaries-retirees, retirement-eligible
employees over sixty-five, and retirement-eligible
employees over sixty-received their full pension. Vested
employees less than sixty years of age, a few of whom had
forty years of service with the firm, received a lump-sum
payment worth about 15% of the value of their pension.
Employees whose benefit accruals had not vested-
including all employees under age forty-got nothing. 5
230. Letter from W.A. Frick and L.J. Fox (Jan. 7, 1964) (UAW Local 5
Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box
28, Pension Plan 1964-65 folder).
231. See Memorandum, Statement Made to Union in Response to Their
Request for Additional Pension Funding (Jan. 20, 1964) (UAW Local 5
Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box
28, Pension Plan 1964-65 folder).
232. WPR Note (Jan. 27, 1964) (UAW President's Office: Walter Reuther
Collection, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Box
117, Folder 7).
233. See Memorandum, Special Meeting-Company Given General
Grievance No. 214 (Oct. 8, 1964) (Collection of the Studebaker National
Museum, South Bend, Indiana, 1964 Negotiations, notebook No. 91.51.192,
Meeting Minutes tab).
234. See Letter from Willard E. Solenberger to Edwin M. Bush, Jr. (July 22,
1964) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
Drawer 1834, Pension Plan Termination (Local No. 5) folder).
235. Studebaker Corporation Pension Plan Termination Agreement (Oct.
15, 1964) (Collection of the Studebaker National Museum, South Bend, Indiana,
Drawer 1834, Pension Plan Termination (Local No. 5) folder); 1966 JEC
Hearings, supra note 85, at 108-09 (statement of Clifford M. MacMillan); id. at
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Although there was little the UAW could do to stop the
Studebaker pension plan from defaulting, union officials
quickly recognized that the publicity surrounding the
shutdown created an opportunity to promote termination
insurance. In the late 1950s and early 1960s public officials
and private-sector experts had begun to give serious
consideration to regulatory initiatives to protect
participants in private pension plans. In 1958 Congress
passed the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, the
first federal statute exclusively addressed to private-sector
employee-benefit plans. 6 In the same year the Pension
Research Council at the University of Pennsylvania began a
major research program to examine "the Security of
Anticipated Benefit Rights under Private Pension Plans." 7
Concerns about the security of pension promises led the
provincial government of Ontario to appoint a Committee
on Portable Pensions in 1960. In August 1961 the
Committee published a report and draft legislation that
would set minimum vesting and funding standards for
retirement plans. 8 And in March 1962 John F. Kennedy
established the President's Committee on Corporate
Pension Funds to study private pension plans in the United
States and make legislative recommendations.239
UAW officials tried several times to get the reinsurance
proposal into the evolving debates over pension legislation.
In 1962 Nat Weinberg and Leonard Lesser pitched the idea
to agency staffers who were preparing the report of the
President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds.24°
122-28 (statement of Willard Solenberger).
236. See Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836,
72 Stat. 997 (1958).
237. Dan M. McGill, Pensions: Current Developments, 13 TRANSACTIONS:
SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES Di01 (1961).
238. See Hilary L. Seal, Ontario's Pension Benefits Bill, 100 TR. AND EST.
816-17 (1961); Donald MacGregor, New Pension Approach, 102 TR. AND EST.
120-21 (1963); Kenneth R. MacGregor, Panel Discussion: Security of Private
Pensions Expectations, 15 TRANSACTIONS: SOC'Y OF ACTUARIES D269, D296
(1963); see also SASS, supra note 11, at 195.
239. Kennedy Memorandum (Mar. 28, 1962), in PRESIDENT'S COM.. ON
CORP. PENSION FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT & WELFARE PROGRAMS,
PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON
PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PROGRAMS, at app.C (1965).
240. Memorandum from Walter Reuther to Nat Weinberg (Mar. 2, 1963)
(UAW Research Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials, Accession No.
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When the Committee submitted an interim report in
November 1962, it did not recommend legislation to create
a reinsurance program because of concerns about the
feasibility of insuring private pensions. The President's
Committee did, however, urge further study of the idea.24'
In January 1963 Kennedy asked another committee-the
President's Labor-Management Advisory Committee-to
review the report of the Committee on Corporate Pension
Funds.242 Walter Reuther was a member of the Labor-
Management Advisory Committee, and Weinberg and
Lesser spent much of 1963 acting as Reuther's
representatives in a group that reviewed the provisional
report.243 The Labor-Management Advisory Committee also
stopped short of endorsing a pension guaranty fund and
recommended further study.
2 4
Union officials saw immediately that the Studebaker
shutdown was an ideal "focusing event" that would make
termination insurance much harder to ignore.245 In a
memorandum written two weeks after Studebaker-Packard
announced the closing, Nat Weinberg told Walter Reuther,
"The Studebaker situation dramatizes the urgent necessity
for [pension reinsurance] legislation."246 The union needed
to move quickly to link the shutdown and the problem of
University, Box 53, Government-Labor-Management Advisory Committee
Correspondence March-June 1963 folder).
241. President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds, Provisional Report
18 (Nov. 15, 1962) (Papers of Walter W. Heller, John F. Kennedy Library, Box
37, March 25, 1963 folder, Labor Management Advisory Committee).
242. Letter from John F. Kennedy to Luther H. Hodges (Feb. 5, 1963)
(White House Central Files, John F. Kennedy Library, EX LA9, Box 466,
Welfare-Pensions-Retirement February 11, 1963 Through folder).
243. See James A. Wooten, Public Policy and Private Pension Programs: A
Political History of the President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds, 59
N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAx'N: EMP. BEN & ExEC. CoMP. (forthcoming 2001).
244. Report to the President from the President's Advisory Committee on
Labor-Management Policy on the Recommendations by the Cabinet Committee
on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and Welfare
Programs, in PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CORP. PENSION FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE
RETIREMENT & WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION
PROGRAMS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
PROGRAMS, at app.D (1965).
245. KINGDON, supra note 3, at 94-95.
246. Letter from Weinberg to Reuther, Dec. 28, 1963, supra note 228; see
also Memorandum on Public Reinsurance of Private Pension Plans (White
House Central Files, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, EX LE/LA6, Railroad
June 26, 1967 folder).
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default risk to the remedy that union officials were already
promoting.
Reuther met with Lyndon Johnson in January 1964 to
discuss "matters relating to the shutdown of Studebaker
operations in South Bend." At Weinberg's urging, Reuther
raised the issue of termination insurance and passed along
a description of the union's proposal.147 But Johnson had
political reasons for steering clear of termination insurance
and other pension reform proposals. Most of the business
and labor leaders on the Labor-Management Advisory
Committee had been hostile to new regulation.4 ' Johnson
was courting business leaders in 1964 and, thus, unlikely to
champion a proposal that was certain to antagonize them.49
Furthermore, 1964 was an election year, and
administration support of a pension reform proposal would
stir up unwelcome controversy.
25 0
Failing to interest the President, the UAW turned to
Congress. In the spring and summer of 1964, union officials
worked with Indiana Senator Vance Hartke to turn the
proposal into legislation. Although UAW pension experts
continued to struggle with the technical complexities of
termination insurance, they recognized that the timing and
presentation of the bill mattered more than its technical
refinement. Thus Willard Solenberger emphasized the need
"to retain the already catchy tag of 'reinsurance' " even
though the yroposal did not technically "reinsure" pension
obligations. The objective was to get policy-makers and
pension experts to pay attention. "[A] primary purpose of
getting a bill introduced at this time," said Solenberger, "is
247. Letter from Weinberg to Reuther, Dec. 28, 1963, supra note 228;
Memorandum on Public Reinsurance of Private Pension Plans, supra note 246.
248. See Report to the President from the President's Advisory Committee
on Labor-Management Policy on the Recommendations by the Cabinet
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement and
Welfare Programs, supra note 244, at 12-19.
249. See Harold B. Meyers, L.B.J.'s Romance with Business, FORTUNE, Sept.
1964, at 131-33, 222, 226, 230.
250. See Memorandum, Stanley Surrey to the Files (June 26, 1964) (The
Papers of Stanley Surrey, Harvard Law School Library, Box 107, Pensions-
Cabinet Committee (2) 1964-1967 folder).
251. See Letter from Willard E. Solenberger to Leonard Lesser (June 24,
1964) (UAW Research Department Collection, Unprocessed Materials,
Accession No. 646, dated June 3, 1974, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs,




its public education aspect-a springboard for generating
widespread discussion and serious consideration by
actuaries, consultants and others with a professional stake
in private pensions, as well as employers, unions and
organizations."52
On August 3, 1964 Hartke introduced "The Federal
Reinsurance of Private Pensions Act."25" Alluding to the
work of the President's Committee on Corporate Pension
Funds and the President's Labor-Management Advisory
Committee, Hartke announced, "Proposals for other
legislation in this field may well develop later, but the need
[for termination insurance] has been evidenced by recent
experience, such as was involved in the closing of the
Studebaker plant in South Bend."254 On the same day
Assistant Treasury Secretary Stanley Surrey asked a
staffer to review the measure. Several days later the staffer
responded, "The Hartke proposal raises most of the
questions and problems [of a termination insurance
program] and solves few."255 Notwithstanding the bill's
technical deficiencies, this exchange was the first evidence
that the UAW's exercise in agenda-setting was succeeding.
As union officials hoped, there was a symbiotic
relationship between the Studebaker shutdown and
Hartke's bill. Studebaker came up when policy-makers and
pension experts discussed termination insurance, and the
shutdown made it more likely that policy-makers and
pension experts would discuss termination insurance. In
this way, the link between Studebaker and termination
insurance secured each an important role in the campaign
for pension reform.
Studebaker quickly emerged as a "battle cry" for
pension reformers.5 6 In 1970 a House Labor Committee
252. Id.
253. S. 3071, 88th Cong. (1964); see 110 CONG. REC. 17,725 (1964).
254. 110 CONG. REC. 17,725 (1964).
255. Memorandum, Stanley Surrey to George Zeitlin (Aug. 3, 1964) (The
Papers of Stanley Surrey, Harvard Law School Library, Box 107, Pensions-
Cabinet Committee (2) 1964-1967 folder); Memorandum, George Zeitlin to
Stanley Surrey (Aug. 6, 1964) (The Papers of Stanley Surrey, Harvard Law
School Library, Box 107, Pensions-Cabinet Committee (2) 1964-1967 folder).
256. Michael Allen, The Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private
Pension Plan Reform Movement, in LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 2, at 70.
Using the search term "Studebaker" in the Arnold & Porter Legislative History
of ERISA on Westlaw I retrieved fifty documents, many of which are hearings
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staffer compared the shutdown to the mine explosion in
Farmington, West Virginia that led Congress to pass the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, while
AFL-CIO lobbyist Andy Biemiller likened it to "the Triangle
fire episode that led to the drive on sweatshops in the
garment industry many years ago."257  Termination
insurance also moved securely onto the reform agenda. "The
question of insurance has a greater degree of immediacy," a
Labor Department official observed in August 1965, "since
Senator Hartke has introduced a bill to establish an
insurance system for private pension funds."258 When the
Johnson administration began preparing pension reform
legislation in 1966, termination insurance was on the
agenda.259  When Senator Jacob Javits introduced
comprehensive pension-reform legislation in 1967, his bill
contained a termination-insurance proposal that drew
many of its provisions from a later version of Hartke's bill.260
And when the Department of Labor introduced its own
comprehensive pension-reform measure in 1968, the bill
included termination insurance.2 '
CONCLUSION
One policy analyst John Kingdon interviewed for his
study of agenda-setting likened policy advocacy to surfing.
"As I see it," the analyst stated, "people who are trying to
advocate change are like surfers waiting for the big wave.
You get out there, you have to be ready to go, you have to be
ready to paddle. If you're not ready to paddle when the big
wave comes along, you're not going to ride it in."262 In terms
of this metaphor, an issue is more likely to make it onto the
policy-making agenda if an advocate-the surfer-with a
proposal-a surfboard-is ready and waiting when a
257. See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Legislation: Hearings on H.R.
1045, H.R. 1046, and H.R. 16462 Before Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong. 155 (1970).
258. Questions Raised by Reaction to Report Public Policy and Private
Pension Programs, attached to Memorandum, William Gibb to the Files (Aug.
12, 1965) (The Papers of Stanley Surrey, Harvard Law School Library, Box 107,
Pensions-Cabinet Committee (2) 1964-1967 folder).
259. See Minutes, Meeting No. 8 (Apr. 20, 1966) (Department of Commerce,
Accession No. 40-73-035, Box 4 of 9, Pension Plan Data-1966 folder).
260. See S. 1103, 90th Cong. (1967).
261. See S. 3421, 90th Cong. (1968).
262. KINGDON, supra note 3, at 165.
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focusing event-the wave-comes along. This study of
Studebaker-Packard and its pension plans explains why
there was a wave-the default of the Studebaker pension
plan-and why the UAW was ready to ride that wave when
it came along in December 1963.
The first element of the explanation is a particular
state of affairs. In the years after World War II the UAW
and employers contracted to establish retirement plans.
Retirement plans work according to a set of principles. In
Dan McGill's phrase, pension plans behave in accordance
with certain "fundamentals." In the 1950s, one such
fundamental was the trade-off among benefit levels, cost,
and risk. All other things equal, higher benefit levels
increased the cost of a retirement plan. If a plan sponsor
held down the short-term cost by pushing the incidence of
pension expense into the future, then participants faced
greater risk that the plan would default. For reasons
explained in Part III, the UAW and the employers with
which it bargained struck a balance that exposed younger
workers to default risk.
The second element of the explanation is an actor with
a reason to change the status quo. The Packard termination
convinced UAW president Walter Reuther that the union
needed to protect its members from default risk. Reuther's
decision confronted the union with a choice. The UAW could
alter its behavior within the constraints of the existing
fundamentals of private pensions. This would involve
slowing the growth of benefits-so that retirees would
receive lower pensions-or demanding more rapid
funding-in which case, active workers would receive lower
wages. Alternatively, the UAW could attempt to alter the
basic relationships among benefit levels, cost, and risk. The
union chose the latter course. At Reuther's direction, UAW
pension specialists created the third major element in the
explanation-a proposal for plan-termination insurance.
The "reinsurance" proposal aimed to change the way
pension plans worked by shifting default risk from
employees in weak firms to the insurance program.
In terms of the surfing metaphor, when Studebaker-
Packard terminated the Packard pension plan in 1958, a
wave rolled past a surfer who did not have a surfboard. In
contrast, when UAW officials pitched termination insurance
to the President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds
in 1962 and to the President's Labor-Management Advisory
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Committee in 1963, the union was like a surfer with a
surfboard but no wave. When Studebaker-Packard
announced the plant closing in 1963, UAW officials
recognized that this might be the wave they were waiting
for. Policy advocacy is generally a probabilistic enterprise./
The coexistence of an advocate, a proposal, and a calamity
increases the likelihood that an issue will gain entry to the
policy-making agenda, but policy advocacy is seldom a sure
thing. In the Studebaker case, the elements came together,
and Studebaker and termination insurance gained a secure
place in the thinking of pension policy-makers.
In closing, it is worth adding two caveats. First,
although the Studebaker shutdown occupies a prominent
place in the collective consciousness of the employee-benefit
community, its role in the political history of pension reform
seems highly contingent. The shutdown provided a symbol
that rallied reformers and an occasion for the UAW to push
termination insurance onto the policy-making agenda. That
it had this effect does not mean that termination insurance
would not have made it onto the agenda if there had been
no Studebaker shutdown. In terms of the surfing metaphor,
some other wave might have come along. For example, in
April 1964 Merton Bernstein published The Future of
Private Pensions, a widely noticed and highly critical
examination of the private pension system." Nine months
later, in January 1965, Lyndon Johnson released Public
Policy and Private Pension Programs, the report of the
President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds.265 The
Committee called for expanded regulation of private
pension plans to make employees' expectations more secure.
Books like Rachel Carson's Silent Spring and Ralph Nader's
Unsafe at Any Speed pushed issues onto the policy-making
agenda. 6 '6 Bernstein's book and the Committee's report-
and pressure from the UAW and the United Steelworkers,
263. Id. at 225.
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PROGRAMS (1965).
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another union that was very concerned about default risk-
might have done the same for termination insurance.
Second, it is important to keep in mind that Gerald
Ford did not sign ERISA until September 2, 1974, more
than ten years after Vance Hartke introduced his
"reinsurance" bill. The Studebaker shutdown gave
termination insurance a secure place on the policy-making
agenda, but it did not guarantee that Congress would pass
such a program or even that the program would come to a
vote.267 The shutdown ensured that staffers in Congress and
the executive branch would take a hard look at the problem
Studebaker came to symbolize."' The prospect that public
officials would seriously consider termination insurance
meant that experts in the academic community, interest
groups, and professional organizations would do so as well.
But pension reform was controversial, and no issue more so
than termination insurance. It would require a decade of
insistent, creative policy advocacy for supporters of pension
reform to overwhelm their opponents. Issues and actors
from the story of Studebaker-Packard-default risk,
termination insurance, and the UAW-would play major
roles in the campaign that produced ERISA. But in 1964
most of the work of passing pension-reform legislation
remained to be done.
267. In Kingdon's terms, Studebaker pushed termination insurance higher
on the "governmental agenda," that is, "the list of subjects to which
governmental officials and those around them are paying serious attention."
KINGDON, supra note 3, at 3. To pass into law, a proposal must reach the
"decision agenda," defined as "the list of subjects within the governmental
agenda that are up for an active decision." Id. at 4. To become law, a matter
that reaches the legislative decision agenda generally must secure majority
support from both chambers of Congress and support or acquiescence from the
President.
268. See text accompanying supra notes 257-58.
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